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Chapter 1 analyzes effects of tax-favored savings plans on savings and retirement 
decisions in a realistically specified life-cycle model. Individuals face mortality risk 
and stochastic earnings, allocate assets between conventional savings accounts 
(CSAs) and tax-deferred accounts (TDAs), make endogenous choice of labor supply 
and retirement, and make a separate decision on claiming Social Security. The 
simulations reveal that there is a functional division to some degree between CSAs 
and TDAs, with the former serving mainly for liquidity and the latter for retirement 
and bequests. There is tremendous heterogeneity. The tax incentives are generally 
effective in stimulating new savings for the middle and upper income groups. The 
higher rate of return on TDAs facilitates wealth accumulation, which consequently 
and perhaps unintentionally encourages early retirement. Impatient and low-income 
individuals tend to retire and claim Social Security early. They derive less benefit 
from TDAs since they face lower marginal tax rates and they have limited resources 
to take advantage of TDAs. For them, the income effect dominates and TDAs fail to 
induce new savings. 
  
Chapter 2 attempts quantitatively to measure the efficiency of public spending in 
developing countries. The efficiency is defined as the distance between observed 
input-output combinations and an efficiency frontier. Both input- and output- 
efficiencies are estimated for several health and education output indicators by means 
of the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
techniques. This chapter further seeks to verify empirical regularities associated with 
cross-country efficiency variation. The panel Tobit regressions reveal that countries 
are more likely to register lower efficiency if they are faced with higher government 
expenditure levels, larger wage shares in government budget composition, higher 
ratios of public to private financing in service provision (health), more prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS epidemic (health), stronger external aid dependency, and/or higher income 
inequality (education). Though no causality may be inferred from these exercises, 
they help point at different factors to understand why some countries spend more 
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CHAPTER 1
TAX-DEFERRED SAVINGS AND EARLY RETIREMENT
Abstract
This chapter analyzes effects of tax-favored savings plans on savings and retirement
decisions in a realistically specified life-cycle model. Individuals face mortality risk
and stochastic earnings, allocate assets between conventional savings accounts (CSAs)
and tax-deferred accounts (TDAs), make endogenous choice of labor supply and re-
tirement, and make a separate decision on claiming Social Security. The simulations
reveal that there is a functional division to some degree between CSAs and TDAs,
with the former serving mainly for liquidity and the latter for retirement and be-
quests. There is tremendous heterogeneity. The tax incentives are generally effective
in stimulating new savings for the middle and upper income groups. The higher rate
of return on TDAs facilitates wealth accumulation, which consequently and perhaps
unintentionally encourages early retirement. Impatient and low-income individuals
tend to retire and claim Social Security early. They derive less benefit from TDAs
since they face lower marginal tax rates and they have limited resources to take ad-




This chapter explores the impact of tax deferred accounts (TDAs) on early retirement
decisions and the implication of planned early retirement for the effectiveness of tax
incentives at stimulating new savings.
Tax deferred accounts, particularly IRAs and 401(k)s introduced in early 1980s, were
intended to stimulate private savings to support retirement and economic growth in
the long run. They rapidly became popular. TDA contributions by 1986 exceeded
contributions to traditional defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans
(Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996)) and have accounted for one-third of private savings
ever since (Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994)). 1 Tax deferred programs are also costly.
For instance, Gravelle (2003) estimated that the revenue loss from IRA universal
coverage would be $66 billion for 5 years. The debate about the effectiveness of
tax incentives embedded in TDAs at inducing new savings forms an active strand
of research. Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, 1995) and Poterba, Venti and Wise
(1994, 1995, 1996) view large part of TDA contributions as new savings; Engen and
Gale (1993) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994, 1996) find limited evidence for new
savings; Hubbard and Skinner (1996) judge the effectiveness of saving incentives to
be somewhere in between; and Benjamin (2003) recently estimates that one half of
401(k) balances are new private savings. 2
1Traditional non-401(k) DC plans are primarily funded by employer contributions. Contributions
to 401(k) plans are at the saving choices of participants and are often augmented by employer
matching.
2The assessment of effectiveness should in the first place exclude forced savings by firms replacing
DB pension plans with 401(k)s. Poterba, Venti and Wise (2001) document the shift from employer
managed DB plans to employee controlled DC plans over the last two decades. They point out
2
The effectiveness of tax incentives depends critically on whether TDAs have inspired
new savings. The literature shows that personal savings are largely driven by three
motives: for liquidity (including precautionary and transaction needs), for retirement
preparation and for bequests. Precautionary savings arise when households face un-
certainty over earnings, medical expenses or other shocks and face borrowing limits in
a world of incomplete markets for lending and insurance. Retirement savings are for
life-cycle reasons in order to support consumption absent new flows of labor income.
While these factors can explain the lower tail of the wealth distribution, researchers
have found that the bequest motive plays an important role in generating wealth-
income patterns consistent with the upper tail of wealth. 3 These motives matter
when individuals choose the vehicles for savings. Deposits in TDAs are income tax
deductible, returns accrue tax-free, and taxes are paid upon withdrawal. This tax
structure makes TDAs attractive for long term saving since they provide savers with
a higher return than conventional savings (CSAs). In the meantime, the early with-
drawal penalty makes TDAs a quite costly source for liquidity financing. It thus
makes much sense to make a functional division, allocating savings for liquidity into
CSAs and retirement and bequest savings into TDAs.
The existing literature on the effectiveness of tax incentives has incorporated these
saving motives to some extent, but has not yet captured the complex interactions
that “the micro data show no evidence that the accumulation of 401(k) assets has been offset by a
reduction in defined benefit assets.” This implies that the popularity of TDAs is largely the choice
at employees’ discretion.
3See, among others, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Hurd and Smith (1999), Dynan, Skinner and
Zeldes (1996), and De Nardi (2004).
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between simultaneous savings and leisure choices. Previous studies treat retirement
as an exogenous and mandatory shift at some specific age, which by assumption rules
out a potentially important stimulus to save - the possibility of early retirement.
There is good reason to believe that endogenous retirement choice plays an important
role in shaping the savings profile. If always employed until an exogenous retirement
age, households will boost current consumption as well as gradually accumulating
retirement wealth. With endogenous retirement decisions, however, individuals may
depress their consumption growth rate and contribute to TDAs more significantly in
the preparation for early retirement. In short, the impact of tax incentives on saving
is closely associated with leisure choice and varies at different stages of the life cycle.
Another related strand of research has examined the relationship between wealth
and retirement choice. The literature remains divided. Burtless (1986) shows that
the unanticipated Social Security benefit increases in 1969-1973 induced retirement,
while Krueger and Pischke (1992) find that the reduction in Social Security wealth
did not reverse the decline in labor supply of the “notch” generation. Imbens, Rubin
and Sacerdote (2001) find that lottery wealth induces retirement. Gustman and
Steinmeier (1986) and Samwick (1998) report a small wealth effect on retirement.
Hurd and Reti (2001) find no evidence that large stock market gains induce early
retirement. An apparent caveat of previous studies is that they mainly focus on
wealth change in after-tax accounts, while the omitted wealth in TDAs is substantial
for many households and may constitute an important factor determining retirement.
With higher rates of return, TDAs offer a more effective means for long-term asset
4
accumulation that may encourage early retirement. However, it is a challenge to
empirically identify the wealth effect of TDAs on retirement because of the short
exposure to date of retiring cohorts to these tax deferred programs. A structural life-
cycle model incorporating TDAs serves as a natural step to tackle the wealth effect
on retirement and will shed light on the long-run pattern of labor supply.
This chapter incorporates endogenous labor supply (and thus retirement) decisions
as well as all of the above saving motives into a realistically specified life-cycle model.
Individuals face stochastic earnings in a world of incomplete markets. Realizations of
earnings shocks produce income heterogeneity. Differing attitudes toward disutility of
work generate preference heterogeneity in leisure and retirement choice. The model
captures asset allocations between conventional and tax-deferred savings accounts.
The presence of liquidity constraints justifies the need for savings in CSAs. Retirement
and bequest motives induce households to make optimal allocations into TDAs.
I also carefully introduce a pay-as-you-go Social Security system, for two important
reasons. First, Social Security serves as one of the major financing resources for
retirement in practice, especially for those with relatively low income. Second, in-
corporating Social Security helps to avoid overstating the role of TDAs. Individuals
make endogenous choices on when to claim Social Security, which are separate from
their retirement decisions. This is another contribution of this chapter. Previous
studies assuming identical timing of retirement and benefit take-up found that liquid-
ity constrained individuals should retire early to obtain Social Security. My model
predicts that high-income individuals may choose to retire earlier than otherwise by
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virtue of effective wealth accumulation through TDAs, claiming Social Security as a
complement, even though they are not facing a shortage of income.
The life-cycle model in this chapter is similar in spirit to those in Engen and Gale
(1993) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994). The simulations confirm their findings that
TDA and CSA assets are imperfect substitutes when savings are mainly for liquidity
purpose due to the early withdrawal penalty on TDAs, and that the substitutability
increases with age when savings are mainly for retirement. A step further, I introduce
important new elements: an intentional bequest motive, a separate decision on Social
Security, and particularly endogenous labor supply and retirement decisions for the
reasons outlined above. This comprehensive modeling proves to be fruitful, despite
considerable computational cost, and yields illuminating findings. The effectiveness
of saving incentives varies with income and preference heterogeneity. Tax deferred
programs enhance individual welfare and at the same time encourage early retirement,
perhaps unintentionally. Allowing for early retirement induces individuals in the
model to accumulate more private savings, but with a larger share of asset reshuffling
from CSAs to TDAs.
Several limitations should be noted. First, this model incorporates the public Social
Security system, but assumes no private annuity market nor employer-provided DB
pension plans, and abstracts from employer-matching of contributions to 401(k)s, the
popular DC plans. The literature has postulated private pensions as an important
force manipulating individual retirement behavior, as employees frequently must re-
main with their employer until some specific age to attain pension eligibility. Second,
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housing wealth is not explicitly modeled. For many households, home equity accounts
for a large part of their total wealth, which may substantially restrict their utilization
of TDAs. Third, the model abstracts from medical costs, employer-provided insur-
ance and Medicare programs. Rust and Phelan (1997), Rust (2005), and Blau and
Gilleskie (2003) illustrate that private and public insurance programs have significant
employment effects. Fourth, the model assumes a deterministic rate of return on
savings and does not address the portfolio choice of bonds and equities in CSAs and
TDAs (see Huang (2003), Poterba and Samwick (2003), Shoven and Sialm (2003),
and Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) along this line). 4
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the rela-
tionship between investment horizon and asset location choice; Section 1.3 outlines
the life cycle model featuring asset allocations between CSAs and TDAs, endoge-
nous labor/leisure choice, and separate Social Security decisions in an environment of
stochastic earnings with a comprehensive tax system; Section 1.4 provides heuristic
findings about consumption, savings and retirement decisions; Section 1.5 reports the
findings from numerical simulations; Section 1.6 contains experiments for alternative
TDA policy scenarios and reports experiments for the cases of partial myopia and the
correlation of mortality with income; and Section 1.7 concludes.
4The capital gains tax rate for stocks is typically lower than the marginal tax rate for interest and
labor income. The benefit from tax deferral is thus lower for saving in stocks in TDAs. Dammon,
Spatt and Zhang (2004) show that individuals should hold in priority the heavily taxed bonds in
TDAs. To balance risk exposure, individuals may find it optimal to hold both bonds and stocks in
TDAs, in which case the recent capital gain tax reduction may weaken the tax advantage of TDAs.
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1.2 Asset Location and Investment Horizon
1.2.1 Tax-Deferred and Conventional Savings Accounts
There are two different types of accounts: conventional savings accounts (CSAs) and
tax deferred accounts (TDAs). The former refer to saving vehicles whose funds can
be utilized freely at the owner’s will. The latter refer broadly to special savings
programs, including front-loaded plans such as traditional Individual Retirement Ac-
counts (IRAs), 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and supplemental retirement accounts (SRAs), and
back-loaded plans such as Roth IRAs. For front-loaded plans, both income taxes
on initial contributions and the taxes on interest and capital gains are deferred, and
accumulations are taxed as ordinary income only upon withdrawal. For back-loaded
plans, initial contributions are subject to ordinary income tax and there are no taxes
on future withdrawals. The following example illustrates that Roth IRAs and other
TDAs are similar in nature. Let τ 0 and τ 1 be the current and future income tax rates,
respectively. Suppose pre-tax $1 is invested in a 401(k) and the equivalent after-tax
amount (1− τ 0)$1 in a Roth IRA, and suppose the gross return is R at the terminal
date. Then the after-tax value for a Roth IRA investment is (1− τ 0)R while that for
a 401(k) investment is (1− τ 1)R. Clearly each dollar in a Roth IRA is equivalent to
1−τ0
1−τ1 dollars in a 401(k). The values are identical under if the tax rate applicable to
the individual does not change over time (τ 0 = τ 1), while the 401(k) is more bene-
ficial within a progressive tax system if the timing of withdrawal puts investors in a
lower tax bracket (τ 0 > τ 1). As illustrated by Burman, Gale and Weiner (2001), the
advantage of front-loaded plans lies in the benefit from the much lower tax rate most
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people face in retirement. Back-loaded plans, on the other hand, give taxpayers larger
capacity to shelter funds than front-loaded plans, given equal contribution limits.
Without loss of generality, hereafter, I assume that all TDA contributions are in-
come tax deductible and are capped by an annual limit, that interest accrues tax
free, that withdrawals are taxed at the then-prevailing income tax rate, and that
early withdrawals are subject to penalty. These assumptions are in line with current
regulations.
1.2.2 Asset Locations - Saving for Retirement or for Liquidity
A simple horse race between returns on CSA and TDA investments will help illustrate
the impact of the TDA tax structure on asset location decisions. Let r, τ , and τw
denote the net interest rate, flat income tax rate (for ease of exposition in this section)
and penalty rate on early withdrawals, respectively. A pre-tax dollar can be invested
either in CSAs or in TDAs. A non-deductible CSA investment has a principal $1(1−τ)
and accrues at after-tax rate of return r(1 − τ). It yields the following gross return
in n years:
$1(1− τ)[1 + r(1− τ)]n (1)
A tax-deferred TDA investment has the entire dollar as principal and enjoys a pre-tax
rate of return on interest. For the same horizon it yields the following gross return,
after paying income tax and penalty (if applicable) upon withdrawal:
$1(1 + r)n(1− τ)(1− τw). (2)
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It is apparent that TDAs are superior to CSAs if withdrawals are penalty free (τw =
0). Saving in TDAs is also preferable if the investment is held sufficiently long so that
the tax-deferring benefit more than offsets the penalty, which occurs if















A longer saving horizon is required in order to lock in tax subsidies sufficient to offset
a higher early withdrawal penalty. Conversely, the more significant the tax shelter,
the sooner households can harvest higher yields by investing in TDAs. For instance,
if r = 6%, τ = 25%, and τw = 10%, the investment horizon required to make TDA
investment preferable despite the withdrawal penalty will be almost 11 years, while
τw = 15% and τ = 30% will require n > 16 and n > 9, respectively.
This exercise shows that the investment horizon matters for asset location choice. The
early withdrawal penalty could make TDA investment ex post unattractive relative
to CSAs, unless the probability of early withdrawal is sufficiently small. TDAs are
preferable when savings are for retirement, a long term objective, while CSAs are
the optimal location to establish a buffer against immediate shocks. This is reflected
in the fact that (1) is greater than (2) when n = 1, a short horizon. The simple
comparison of (1) and (2) suggests that the wealth-maximizing investment strategy
10
might be to allocate all incremental savings into TDAs, if feasible, once a certain
liquidity buffer has been established in CSAs.
1.3 A Life Cycle Model
In this section, I outline a rich life-cycle model to capture the labor supply and
consumption behaviors of individuals who are equipped with both TDAs and CSAs
and who save for liquidity reasons, retirement, and bequests.
1.3.1 Preferences
Households have a maximum life span of T years, at which age death is certain. At
each age t 6 T , households derive utility from consumption, leisure and potential





βt [Ψtu(ct, lt) + (1−Ψt)Γ(wt)] (7)
where E0 is the expectation operator; β is the subjective discount factor; Ψt is the
unconditional survival probability, specifically, Ψt = (
Qt
j=1 ψj),with ψt ∈ (0, 1) being
the survival probability at age t conditional on being alive at age t− 1, given ψ0 = 1;
and ct and lt are consumption and leisure, respectively. The period utility function





1− γ + η(t, h, et) ln(lt) (8)
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where γ > 0 indicates an individual’s relative risk aversion. The propensity for
individuals to increase savings as a reaction to uncertainty of income is embedded
in the CRRA function, where the positive third derivative serves as a sufficient (and
necessary) condition for this precautionary motive. The weight on disutility of work,
η(t, h, et), is dependent on age t, health h, and average wages et (defined in (10) to
proxy earnings ability) to reflect that agents’ attitude towards leisure is time-varying
with age and that healthy and well-paid agents tend to view work as less burdensome
(Autor and Duggan, 2003). Such modeling strategy of heterogeneity in preferences
follows the spirit of Rust (2005). Households also derive utility from bequests in case




where the parameter κ measures the attitude towards bequests.
1.3.2 Income and Social Security
I introduce a stochastic labor income process, which is required to generate precau-
tionary savings in CSAs, as described in the literature on “buffer stock” savings (see
Deaton (1991), and Carroll (1992), among others). This is also motivated by the
observation that explicit insurance markets for labor income are not well developed.
Specifically, the labor income process is expressed in (10).
ln(yt) = α0 + α1 ln(et) + α2t+ α3t
2 + εt
εt = ρεt−1 + νt, νt ∼ N(0, σ2ν)
y(lt) = (1− lt)yt (10)
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First, the earnings contains a deterministic component as a function of age t and
average earnings et (defined below as a proxy for AIME), which captures the life-
cycle trend in wages, an approach suggested by Rust and Phelan (1997). 5 Second,
randomness of earnings is introduced through shocks ε0s, with ρ controlling the degree
of persistence. Accumulation of shocks makes life-cycle earnings profiles vary across
individuals, which is an important source of income heterogeneity. Third, given the
above “exogenous” factors, final income y(lt) is endogenously determined by the level
of labor supply (1 − lt). The labor flexibility implies an endogenous decision on the
timing of retirement, which is assumed to be reversible at no cost prior to a mandatory
retirement age, tm.
Social Security benefits, called Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), are determined by
the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). AIME is in practice calculated as
the average of the 35 highest years of earnings. In order to keep the computation
tractable while preserving the essence of Social Security rules, the annualized AIME







where ymax is the maximum of earnings subject to payroll tax and counted toward e.
The PIA, denoted by b, is a concave piece-wise function of the AIME (e∗) achieved
5This modeling strategy has at least three merits. First, the distribution of et effectively captures
fixed effects across individuals since et, as a proxy of AIME, follows a rather gradual evolution and
thus reflects a permanent component of wages. Second, this setup is computationally efficient: with
et already being carried as a state variable, a single solution of the model is sufficient for simulations
to generate income heterogeneity given various initial values for e1. Third, the specification of et and
t fits the real life-cycle trend of wages quite well, which is the ultimate objective of such modeling.
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at the claim age (t∗). For t = t∗, t∗ + 1, t∗ + 2, ..., T ,
b =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{bmin, α0e∗}, if e∗ < B1
α1 + α2 (e
∗ −B1) , if B1 6 e∗ < B2
α3 + α4 (e
∗ −B2) , if B2 6 e∗
(12)
where B1 and B2 are referred to as the bend points, and bmin is the minimum floor
of Social Security benefits. Individuals are assumed to make separate decisions with
regard to the timing of retirement and take-up of Social Security benefits. They can
elect to claim Social Security provided that they have reached the early retirement
age, te. However, benefits are higher if individuals wait until a normal retirement
age, tn, where te < tn < tm. Social Security claiming is irreversible; that is, once
individuals begin receiving Social Security they are locked into their PIA annuity
for their remaining lifetime. According to current regulations, early claims prior
to age tn are granted lower benefits, while delayed claims past tn get credit. Both
adjustments are approximately actuarially fair for the average person. In addition,
Social Security benefits are subject to an earnings test if individuals are younger than
tm. Early claims face a higher earnings test tax rate and a lower exempt minimum
compared with delayed claims. Specifically, Social Security benefits are reduced by
τ 0max{y(lt)−y0, 0} for claims between ages te and tn, and by τ 1max{y(lt)−y1, 0} for
claims between ages tn and tm, with τ 0 > τ 1 and y0 < y1. Obviously, the reduction
is no larger than b.
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1.3.3 The Household Optimization Problem
Let a and q denote assets in CSAs and TDAs, respectively. I impose the following sim-
ple liquidity restrictions on CSAs and TDAs via (13)-(14). These conditions prevent
households from capitalizing or borrowing against future labor income or retirement
wealth.
at > 0,∀t (13)
qt > 0,∀t (14)
Households can contribute to TDAs up to ξ percent of labor income or a specific
ceiling, L, whichever is smaller. They may instead choose to draw down TDA assets.
Formally, if the TDA transaction in dollars is denoted by xt, then
−(1 + r)qt 6 xt 6 min{ξy(lt), L} (15)
where positive values of xt imply contributions, and negative values represent with-
drawals. Condition (15) mandates that TDA contributions are not feasible when there
is no labor income (y(lt) = 0), which is consistent with tax regulations in practice.
Contributions are tax deductible, while early withdrawals are subject to penalty at
rate τw prior to the penalty-free age, tf . Households need to pay federal and state
income taxes on TDA withdrawals at then-prevailing rates regardless of age.
Households’ dynamic budget constraints for CSAs and TDAs evolve as follows:
at+1 = (1 + r)at + y(lt) + b− (1− λtτw)xt − ct
−τ(y(lt), xt, rat, b)− τ smin{ymax, y(lt)} (16)
qt+1 = (1 + r)qt + xt (17)
15
where λt is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if xt < 0 and t < te, and 0
otherwise; τ s denotes the payroll tax at rate, and τ(y(lt), b, xt, rat) encompasses all
other taxes including a progressive tax on labor income, the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), income taxes (or refunds) on TDA withdrawals (contributions), taxes
on CSA interest, taxes on income-adjusted Social Security benefits, and taxes due to
the earnings test. It should be stressed that CSA assets accrue at an after-tax rate
while TDAs accrue tax free. Early TDA withdrawals are costly due to the penalty
(τwxt) in addition to the income tax.
The consumer’s problem is to maximize the discounted expected lifetime utility in
(7), given initial endowment of wealth, subject to the short-selling constraints (13)-
(14) and the dynamic budget constraints (15)-(17). The beginning-of-period state
variables are Λt = {t, at, et, qt, εt, zst }, and the choice variables {ct, lt, xt, zdt }, where zst
and zdt are the Social Security claim status and claim decision, respectively. Individuals
must decide on consumption, ct, labor supply, lt, asset allocation between TDAs and
CSAs, xt, and whether to claim Social Security, zdt . It should be noted that labor
earnings are unknown due to their stochastic nature when consumption decisions
are made. Individuals in the model are thus restricted to consume no more than
their current tangible wealth in CSAs and TDAs, net of taxes and early withdrawal
penalty if applicable. 6 This implies that they cannot borrow against future earnings.
Specifically,
ct 6 (1 + r)(at + qt) + b− τ(0, (1 + r)qt, rat, b)− λtτw(1 + r)qt (18)
6This restriction implies that part of CSA balances are assets-in-advance for transaction purposes.
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However, realizations of earnings must be revealed when individuals are making TDA
contributions since they need to know the limit imposed by xt 6 min{ξy(lt), L}.
Otherwise, there would exist cases in which TDA contributions could exceed labor
earnings, yielding negative CSA balances in violation of condition at > 0. Let V (Λt)
be the indirect value function for the dynamic programming problem. Then,
V (Λt) = max
ct,lt,xt,zdt
{u(ct, lt) + β[ψt+1EtV (Λt+1) + (1− ψt+1)EtΓ(wt+1)]} (19)
subject to constraints (13)-(17), where Et is the expectation over the distribution of
Λt+1 conditional on information at t. Terminal wealth w is the combined TDA and
CSA assets.
1.4 Some Heuristic Findings
This complex dynamic programming problem calls for numerical solution and simula-
tion of life-cycle behavior. Before presenting numerical results, it is worth highlighting
some heuristic findings in a simplified version of the model in which I assume a flat
and constant income tax rate τ , maintaining the assumptions that TDAs accrue tax
free and are subject to early withdrawal penalty. These simplifications preserve the
main characteristics of TDAs, while allowing for a progressive tax system would fur-




The first order necessary conditions of the utility maximization problem with respect
to at+1 and qt+1 at age t are (20) and (21), respectively.
u0c(ct, lt) = β [1 + (1− τ)r]Et[ψt+1u0c(ct+1, lt+1)
+(1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1)] +Etµat+1 (20)
(1− λtτw)u0c(ct, lt) = β(1 + r)Et[(1− λt+1τw)ψt+1u0c(ct+1, lt+1)
+(1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1)]− µLt + (1 + r)EtµLt+1 +Etµqt+1 (21)
where µat and µ
q
t are the Lagrange multipliers on the non-negativity constraints for
CSAs and TDAs; and µLt is the Lagrange multiplier on the contribution limit.
Condition (20) is the Euler equation with respect to at+1. It implies that households
will balance consumption and CSA saving so that the marginal utility of a unit of
current consumption is equal to the marginal benefit of saving the same unit, which
includes the discounted marginal utility of future consumption or bequests and the
expected benefit from avoiding the liquidity constraint (Etµat+1).
Condition (21) is the Euler equation with respect to qt+1, which embodies a similar
intuition for the optimal allocation between consumption and saving in TDAs. The
difference lies in the fact that the TDA savings have a higher rate of return and the
fact that the intertemporal optimization regarding TDAs might be inhibited by the
contribution limit. The marginal benefit of contributing in period t (thus λt = 0) is
equal to the expected marginal utility of future consumption or bequests, plus the
expected gain from avoiding the contribution limit and the liquidity constraint next
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period. Proposition 1 follows from further examination of (21).
Remark 1. (i) The expected marginal benefit of TDA saving is lowered by the with-
drawal penalty when it applies (i.e. when λt+1 = 1); (ii) An individual may not be
able to fully realize the benefit of contributing due to the contribution limit (i.e. when
µLt > 0); and (iii) The marginal benefit of withdrawing (thus λt = 1) in period t is
shrunk by the penalty and carries a higher opportunity cost in terms of lower wealth
accumulation for future.
Tax advantages induce wealth accumulation through TDAs, while the precautionary
motive keeps savings in CSAs. The balance is struck by combining (20) and (21).
The resulting equation (see Appendix 1.A) implies that an optimal interior asset
allocation between CSAs and TDAs is reached when a dollar contribution to CSAs or
TDAs brings the same level of marginal expected utility (otherwise a corner solution
emerges, so that contributions will be made in only one type of account). Some
simplification yields a straightforward interpretation for a special case in which the
individual contributes to TDAs at age t (thus λt = 0) and the individual’s future
withdrawals are not subject to penalty (i.e. λt+1 = 0 with probability one). The
following condition holds in this special case:
βτrEt[ψt+1u
0





t − (1 + r)EtµLt+1 −Etµqt+1 (22)
The left hand side of equation (22) measures the advantage of contributing to TDAs
rather than to CSAs, which is the discounted marginal expected utility due to the
tax shelter on interest (via the term τr). Note that EtµLt+1 > 0 and Etµqt+1 > 0 and
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note also that the left hand side of equation (22) is strictly positive. The relative tax
advantage for TDAs in this special case of no withdrawal penalties thus implies either
a binding contribution limit (µLt > 0) or a binding constraint on borrowing against
CSAs (Etµat+1 > 0).
Remark 2. Absent withdrawal penalty, all individuals would contribute to the limit.
1.4.2 Saving Rules
Another way of seeing the impact of TDA rules on the allocation of savings heuris-
tically is to examine the marginal value of CSA and TDA wealth. Applying the
Envelope Theorem with respect to at and qt, respectively, to the indirect value func-
tion and shifting one period forward produces the following conditions.
EtV
0
a (Λt+1) = [1 + r(1− τ)]Et[µBt+1 + β(1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1)] +Etµat+1 (23)
EtV
0
q (Λt+1) = (1 + r)Et[µ
B
t+1(1− λt+1τw)
+β(1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1) + µLt+1] +Etµqt+1 (24)
where µBt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier on the dynamic budget constraint in period
t+ 1. Several interesting findings are exhibited in Proposition 3.
Remark 3. (i) Absent a sufficient CSA buffer, it is not optimal to overinvest in
TDAs. Shocks materialized next period may force early withdrawal (hence λt+1 = 1





q (Λt+1). (ii) With a sufficient CSA buffer, savings for retirement should be al-
located to TDAs since EtV 0q (Λt+1) > EtV
0
a(Λt+1) when λt+1 = 0 with probability
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1. (iii) The presence of a bequest motive encourages both CSA and TDA savings,
with the marginal benefit of TDA savings enhanced more substantially simply because
1 + r > 1 + r(1 − τ). (iv) The stronger the bequest motive, the more valuable are











Another way of viewing (23) and (24) heuristically is that they imply an optimal
sequencing of withdrawals from TDAs and CSAs, should the household need to dis-
save. For a given-sized transaction and absent withdrawal penalty, the opportunity
cost of drawing down TDAs is larger than that of drawing down CSAs by a factor
of (1 + r)/[1 + r(1 − τ)]. In addition, when a withdrawal penalty exists, households
have to increase TDA withdrawals by a factor of 1/(1− τw) to get the same level of
financing.
Remark 4. TDA withdrawals are more costly and individuals should first exhaust
CSA funds before tapping TDAs.
1.4.3 Retirement Effect of TDAs
Comparative statics help illustrate the impact of CSA and TDA wealth on leisure








These inequalities imply that higher wealth accumulated to date, either in CSAs or
TDAs, tends to induce more leisure or even complete exit from labor force (retire-







which is particularly true once the agent is old enough that TDA withdrawals are
penalty free. The inequality in (27) implies that TDA wealth has a larger impact on
labor supply and that early retirement becomes easier with TDAwealth accumulation.
Remark 5. Leisure is a normal good and the higher pre-tax rate of return on TDAs
provides a greater income effect, which encourages more retirement.
1.5 Numerical Analysis
I now return to the fully-loaded version of the model and use numerical methods to
analyze consumers’ saving, labor supply, and Social Security claim decisions. The
computation begins by discretizing the continuous state variables. The utility maxi-
mization problem is then solved backward from age T to age t1 for all feasible combi-
nations of state grid points and realizations of random variables. The optimal decision
rules are recorded along this backward process. Large scale Monte Carlo simulations
are finally carried out to generate average life-cycle profiles based on the decision rules
derived above. See Appendix 1.B for details of the solution method.
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1.5.1 State and Choice Variables
Some explanation of the discretization of variables is in order. Following Rust (2005)
and Gustman and Steinmeier (2003), I introduce limited labor flexibility. Specifically,
I assume discrete leisure choice, i.e. lt ∈ {1, .817, .543}, where full leisure (no work)
is normalized to 1, and leisure for part-time and full-time work is .817 and .543,
respectively. 7 This assumption, in spite of its restriction on labor adjustment, may
reflect the real world given the observation that legal and institutional impediments
make phased retirement difficult to achieve (Penner, Perun and Steuerle (2002)).
Ruhm (1990) finds that transition through bridge jobs or part-time employment is
common for employees who desire partial retirement. It is assumed that individuals
make discretionary decisions on labor supply before age 70 and that all employees
must retire no later than 70.
The Social Security payment status zst is either 0, which indicates non-eligibility
or non-claiming, or one of {62, 63, ...70}, which indicates the age when an individual
starts to claim and receive Social Security benefits. The Social Security claim decision
zdt indicates individuals’ choices conditional on not previously claiming benefits: to
claim (zdt = 1) or not to claim (z
d
t = 0). Agents who claim receive the annuity value
determined at the first claim age for their remaining life span. Agents cannot reverse
their decision to claim. The actually disposable value of Social Security benefits may
vary due to the earnings test.
7Assuming that 12 hours a day are available for discretionary work/leisure, and assuming 2000
hours a year (40hours*50weeks) are required for a full-time job, then lt = (12∗365−2000)/(12∗365) =
.543. Similarly, assuming 800 hours for a part-time job generate lt = (12∗365−800)/(12∗365) = .817.
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Households can elect to claim Social Security when t ∈ {62, 63, ...70}. The end points
are the early and the mandatory retirement age, respectively. No Social Security
benefit may be granted prior to 62. Early claims prior to the normal retirement/claim
age 65 receive benefits reduced by an approximately actuarially fair factor of 6.67%
per year prior to 65. For instance, a claim at age 62 will receive 80% of the normal
benefit. 8 Delayed claims past 65 are awarded delayed credit, which is not applicable
beyond age 70. The credit factor is assumed to be 5% for each year delayed. 9 Benefits
between ages 62 and 70 may be partially or entirely taxed away depending on the
level of labor income. The earnings test prior to age 65 is more stringent than after,
which is reflected in the earnings test tax rates (τ 0 = 50% and τ 1 = 33.3%) and the
exempt minima (y0 = $10, 800 and y1 = $17, 000). 10 These assumptions are largely
consistent with current Social Security rules.
Table 1. Summary of State Variables
Symbol Description Type
t Age discrete, t ∈ {21, 22, ...90}
at CSA savings continuous, at ∈ [0,∞)
et AIME continuous, et ∈ [0, 72.6]
qt TDA savings continuous, qt ∈ [0,∞)
εt Persistent shock Markov chain
zst S.S. claim status discrete, z
s
t ∈ {0, 62, 63, ...70}
8The normal retirement age is now increasing gradually to 67 for individuals born in 1960 or
later. The benefit reduction for retirement at 62 will rise to 30% for those born in 1960 or later.
9In practice, the annual delayed retirement credit varies from 3% to 8% by birth year. Individuals
born in 1924 receive 3% more benefit per delayed year. The annual credit increases by 0.5% for each
additional two years after birth year 1924 until it reaches 8% for those born in 1943 or later.
10The earnings test for ages 66 to 69 has been recently eliminated. Some researchers list this
policy change as one of the reasons for the recently observed increase in labor supply among the old.
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Table 2. Summary of Choice Variables
Symbol Description Type
ct Consumption continuous
lt Leisure choice discrete, lt ∈ {1, .817, .543}
xt Asset allocation continuous
zdt S.S. claim decision discrete, z
d
t ∈ {0, 1}
1.5.2 Parameter Calibrations
Individuals in the model make decisions starting at age 21 and can live up to age
90. The conditional survival probabilities, ψt, are the death rates for males in the
Decennial Life Tables maintained by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention. The value of the subjective discount factor, β, has been usually taken to be
less than unity to reflect impatience (e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987 and Hubbard
and Judd, 1987), although empirical evidence has also suggested values larger than
unity (Hurd, 1989). The discount factor β is set to be 0.98 in this model. There is a
wide range of empirical estimates for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/γ
(the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion). Hall (1988) believes 1/γ
very close to zero. Kydland and Prescott (1982) calibrate 1/γ to 0.66. Carroll (2001)
views γ between [1, 5] as generally plausible. I set 1/γ = 0.73 to reflect moderate risk
aversion. I assume as a benchmark that there is a modest bequest motive, setting
κ = 0.2.
The weight on disutility of work, η(t, h, et), is assumed to increase with age t and
to decrease with et, a proxy of earnings ability. The notion that the utility function
changes over time because of changes in disutility of work is supported by Autor and
Duggan (2003) who show that disability rates increase with age. The weight on leisure
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η(t, h, et) also increases with the deterioration of health h, a notion supported by the
findings by Duggan, Singleton and Song (2005). This case is explored in Section 1.6.
Graphically, Figure 1 shows the heterogeneity in preferences introduced by the weight
on leisure.
The coefficients governing the life-cycle trend of earnings in (10) are estimated on
the restricted Social Security earnings data from HRS and are reported in Table 3.
The persistent shocks are approximated by a 2-state Markov chain with σ2ν = .06 and
ρ = .935. These shock parameters are obtained from Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(1998). Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2004) report similar estimates. Their
common emphasis is the importance of persistent and transitory shocks in forming
individuals’ earnings profiles. Figure 2 shows the heterogeneity in income and the
corresponding AIME generated by this formulation.
























Figure 1: Heterogeneity in Preferences
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Figure 2: Heterogeneity in Income and AIME
The tax structure is constant over the life cycle. The income tax is intended to mimic
the 2000 individual tax code, which includes a progressive Federal income tax schedule
with tax brackets of 15, 28, 36 and 39.6 percent and a flat 5% state and local tax. 11
The model also incorporates a detailed Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) applicable
to low income individuals. The payroll tax rate, τ s, is 6.2% for Old Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and is applied to earnings up to a maximum of
$76,200. 12 The parameter values and bend points determining PIA in (12) follow
11The marginal tax rate according to 2000 Federal tax code is 15 percent on income below $26,250,
28 percent on income between $26,251 and $63,550, 31 percent on income between $63,551 and
$132,600, 36 percent on income between $132,601 and $288,350, and 39.6 percent on income above
$288,350.
12I abstract from the Medicare tax since no medical costs are explicitly modeled. In practice the
Medicare tax rate (HI) is 1.45%. The employer and employee combined rate for OASDI and HI is
15.3%.
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the 2000 Social Security regulations. 13 The before tax return on savings is set to
be 4%. 14
According to the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, individuals who are
591
2
or older are allowed to draw on their IRAs without penalty. Thus the penalty
free age in the model is tf = 60. The TDA contribution ceiling L is equal to $10,500,
which was the value of the elective contribution limit on 401(k) plans in 2000. 15
In addition, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates that
employer and employee tax-deferred contributions combined can not exceed 25 per-
cent of total earned income. These rules apply as well to other defined contribution
plans, such as IRAs and Keogh plans. Many employers impose even tighter limits in
the range of 10-15%. 16 Here I set ξ = 25%. Early withdrawals are subject to a 10
percent penalty according to ERISA. Therefore, I set τw = 10%. The regulatory rules
on special retirement accounts generally prohibit early withdrawals except in some
special circumstances. 17
13The values for PIA formula in Table 3 are monthly figures. PIA parameters are calculated as
follows: α1 = α0B1 = 477.9, α3 = α1 + α2(B2 −B1) = 1332.6.
14This rate of return implicitly assumes a portfolio composed of both stocks and bonds. Scholz,
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2004) report 7.6% as the average real stock market return between 1947
and 1996 and 0.8% as the average real return on 3-month Treasury bills (footnote 16).
15IRA contribution limits vary by year and age: they are $3,000 in 2002-2004, $4,000 in 2005-2007
and $5,000 in 2008; and individuals over 50 have a further $500 in 2002 and $1,000 in 2006. Limits
will be indexed for inflation after 2008. Traditional IRA contributions are fully tax deductible if the
owner does not participate in a 401(k) or other qualified retirement plan; otherwise the deductibility
may decline to zero depending on the owner’s modified adjusted gross income (AGI).
16See Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) (page 89).
17Some 401(k) plans allow the owners to borrow against their vested balances up to a limit for
specific reasons. They must pay the loan back with interest over a short period; otherwise a 10%
early withdrawal penalty will apply in addition to income tax. Borrowing implies the loss of the tax-
deferring advantage and the loan is repaid with after-tax income. IRA owners are subject to a five-
tax-year waiting period before any withdrawal. There are exceptions to early withdrawal penalties
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Table 3. Parameter Calibrations
Preferences Ages
β = 0.98 discount factor t1 = 21 starting age
γ = 1.37 CRRA value tf = 60 penalty free
η(t, h, et) see text te = 62 early retirement
κ = 0.2 bequest factor tn = 65 normal ret.
Ψ, ψ survival rate tm = 70 mandatory ret.
r = .04 interest rate T = 90 max. life span
PIA Formula Earnings Process
bmin = $300 α0 = .9 δ0 = −1.05 δ1 = 1.20
α1 = $478 α2 = .32 δ2 = .04 δ3 = −.0005
α3 = $1333 α4 = .15 ρ = .935 σ
2
ν = .06
B1 = $531 B2 = $3202 σ
2
ε = .008
Income and Payroll Tax TDA Rules
{.15, .28, .36, .396} tax brackets τw = .10 penalty rate
{.05} state tax ξ = .25 contribution
τ s = .062 OASDI tax L = $10, 500 limit
ymax = $76, 200 max. taxable
Earnings test
τ 0 = .50 y0 = $10, 080
τ 1 = .333 y1 = $17, 000
1.5.3 Benchmark Saving and Retirement
As a benchmark, I first examine individuals’ behavior when TDAs are not available.
Figure 3 shows life-cycle profiles for savings (CSAs only), consumption, employment,
and labor income, which are averages over a large number of simulations. In the
early phase of the life cycle, individuals need to rapidly build up a liquidity stock
for precautionary and transaction reasons. Early consumption is depressed to some
extent and closely tracks labor income, shifting upward as more resources become
available. In the latter phase of the life cycle, effective impatience increases due to
but most do not apply to average tax payers. Such special events include permanent disability or
death of the IRA owner, serious illness with expenses in excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income,
first-time home purchase with a lifetime limit of $10,000, and medical insurance payment conditional
on unemployment for more than twelve weeks.
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higher mortality risk. They are also assigning greater utility weight to leisure than
they did earlier in life due to changing preferences. The consumption path hence
slopes downward at this stage. A hump shape of life-cycle consumption emerges.













































































Figure 3: Benchmark Simulations - No TDAs
Once the buffer stock has reached a reasonable level, individuals start saving mainly
for retirement. Individuals in the model start reducing labor supply on average in
their late 50’s. Wealth is decumulated to support consumption upon the transition
from full-time to part-time work and the decumulation is more rapid after full retire-
ment at age 70. Allowing for uncertain events during retirement in addition to the
bequest motive would likely slow down the pace of wealth depletion. For instance,
Rust (2005) shows that stochastic medical costs (and hence insurance coverage) have
a large impact on faculty decisions regarding retirement, consumption, and wealth
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decumulation.
The timing of retirement is determined by several factors. First, changes in atti-
tude towards work (i.e., η) make leisure significantly more appealing as agents age.
Second, wealth accumulated is sufficient to support retirement consumption and be-
quests. Third, Social Security wealth facilitates the transition to lower labor supply.
Although retirement and Social Security take-up are two discretionary decisions, they
are not necessarily independent due to the existence of the earnings test. It is not
optimal to claim Social Security while working full time if the earnings test will tax
away all the benefits. The benchmark simulations show that quite a few individuals
choose to switch to a part-time job in their 50’s or 60’s. The prevalence of part-time
work echoes the findings by Ruhm (1990), who presents evidence from the Retirement
History Longitudinal Survey “suggesting that partial retirement is both more preva-
lent and longer lasting than is generally believed” (p. 490). Fewer than two-fifth of
the respondents retired directly from career jobs. Korczyk (2004) reports that 70 to
80 percent of older workers in surveys and public opinion polls expect to work at least
part time in retirement. There apparently exists considerable discrepancy between
the number of workers who desire to work part-time and the number who actually do
so, due to various real world constraints. My model abstracts from these constraints
and thus allows frictionless transitions from full-time to part-time jobs.
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1.5.4 Wealth Allocation between TDAs and CSAs
This subsection describes life-cycle behaviors when both CSAs and TDAs are avail-
able. Figure 4 shows that individuals now allocate a substantial share of total wealth
into TDAs. It demonstrates that there is to some degree a functional division be-
tween CSAs and TDAs, with the former serving mainly for liquidity and the latter
for retirement. Savings are solely directed into CSAs in the beginning so as to rapidly
establish a liquidity stock as a cushion against negative earnings shocks. 18 CSA bal-
ances increase with consumption because a bigger liquidity stock in CSAs is needed
to accommodate a higher consumption. TDA contributions occur, up to the limit if
desirable, when CSA savings have reached a reasonable level. Apparently, wealth ac-
cumulation through TDAs is not always feasible, particularly when individuals have
no income available for TDA after giving priority to CSA buffer buildup. Alterna-
tively, TDA contributions may hit the annual limit.
As illustrated in Section 1.2, sequencing savings between CSAs and TDAs is an op-
timal strategy in that forced early withdrawal from TDAs is costly. This does not
necessarily imply that households require a liquidity buffer in CSAs that can abso-
lutely cover all income shocks. TDAs may satisfy part of the need for precautionary
savings since, after a period of time, the higher effective rate of return will more than
offset the early withdrawal penalty. On the one hand, the bigger the liquidity buffer
in CSAs, the less likely one is to suffer penalties or marginal disutility of reduced con-
18This model abstracts from the case where employers match TDA contributions. Employer
matching could make contributing early optimal, even with the need to build up liquidity savings in
CSAs.
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sumption in case of shocks. On the other hand, the earlier the TDA contributions, the
larger effective tax subsidies can be harvested for retirement. The trade-off encour-
ages households to accumulate a reasonable level in CSAs and then use TDA assets
as a backup. When adverse shocks strike and the CSA balance falls short, households
will partially liquidate TDA assets to inject liquidity into their CSA buffer.
Heterogeneity in preferences and income serves to shape the savings profile. Individ-
uals with low income and low AIME attach higher weight to leisure and will choose
to retire early. They exhaust CSA balances first and start tapping TDA assets at
age 60 since TDAs are now equally liquid without penalty. Others, those with high
earnings ability, may choose to continue to work and contribute to TDAs until age
70. Restricted by contribution limits, their labor income cannot be fully sheltered in
TDAs and thus they continue to accumulate in CSAs.






















CSA and TDA Savings
CSA Balance
TDA Balance
Figure 4: Asset Allocation between CSAs and TDAs
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1.5.5 Effectiveness of Saving Incentives
One important and widely debated issue is whether special retirement programs have
generated new private savings. That is, to what extent are CSA and TDA savings
substitutes? Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) and Gale and Scholz (1994) find little
evidence that retirement programs raise private savings. On the contrary, Poterba,
Venti, and Wise (1995, 1997) and Venti and Wise (1986, 1990, 1995) argue that IRAs
and 401(k)s do not crowd out other assets but instead constitute new savings.
This quantitative life-cycle model sheds new light on this issue. First, the simulations
clearly show that at least part of TDA savings are reshuffled from CSA savings.
That is, the portion of CSA savings earmarked for retirement in the benchmark case
are now shifted to TDAs. The simulated peak value of CSA assets on average is
approximately $160,000 in the benchmark case, while the average CSA balance never
exceeds $50,000 in the case with TDAs. Second, the tax incentives have limited effect
on households in their early 20’s, who have limited resources for long-term investment.
The introduction of TDAs leads to little new savings in the very early stage of building
up the CSA buffer. Third, in the TDA accumulation stage, the effective tax subsidy
generates a substitution effect that induces more saving. At the same time, since TDA
assets are accruing at a higher pre-tax rate, the income effect will depress savings.
Whether TDAs lead to new saving depends on which effect dominates. Figure 5
reveals that the substitution effect dominates between ages 20 and 45, as individuals
sacrifice consumption to some extent in working years when TDAs are present. The
difference between benchmark consumption and the path with TDAs constitutes new
34
private savings in the early phase of the life cycle. In the later phase, TDAs facilitate
a higher consumption path and encourage early retirement (see the next subsection
for retirement behavior). The income effect thus dominates later since consumption
and leisure are both normal goods.






























Figure 5: Comparison of Consumption
Some caution should be used when assessing the effectiveness of TDAs at stimulating
new savings. This model is a partial equilibrium analysis, with the objective being to
gain a deep understanding of the complex individual decisions. The model implicitly
assumes that wages, rates of return, and tax rates are unchanged in spite of the
introduction of TDAs. 19 Government revenue loss due to the tax deduction on TDA
contributions is not made up by imposing other taxes. Although government can
partially recover these taxes upon TDA withdrawals, individuals may still receive net
19The curse of dimensionality, due to the large number of state and choice variables, makes it
difficult to extend the model to a general equilibrium framework while preserving the rich features.
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tax subsidies. The effectiveness of TDAs can be assessed only after subtracting tax
loss from private savings. This loss is defined as the difference between tax revenue
with TDAs and that without TDAs. Tax revenue includes the payroll tax on labor
earnings, the progressive income tax on earnings, interest, TDA withdrawals, and
income-adjusted Social Security benefits, the penalty on early TDA withdrawals, and
the tax from the earnings test. The introduction of TDAs leads to a different life-cycle
tax profile. Tax revenue prior to retirement is lower with TDAs due to the tax deferral
associated with TDA contributions. Early retirement encouraged by TDAs (see the
next subsection) implies further tax loss compared with the benchmark case since
lower labor participation undercuts the tax base substantially. Tax revenue recovers
considerably in one’s 60’s and 70’s by virtue of the income tax on TDA withdrawals.
Table 4 reports the effectiveness of TDAs by age groups. Column 1 contains average
contributions to CSAs in the benchmark case. Column 2 contains mean overall con-
tributions when TDAs are available. The fraction of TDA contributions is reported in
column 3. Mean tax loss is defined as above. Net new savings are calculated by net-
ting out asset reshuffle and tax loss, specifically, defined as column 2 minus columns
1 and 4, all divided by column 3. Clearly, tax-deferred programs produce private
saving at the cost of government revenue. But they effectively induce substantial new
national saving during the working years. A considerable fraction of these new sav-
ings are utilized to finance early retirement, which is reflected in the apparently lower
net new savings for ages 51-65 (8%) and even negative net new savings (-11%) for
ages 61-65. These simple calculations suggest that the possibility of early retirement
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enhances the incentive to save through TDAs and that early retirement, facilitated
by tax advantages in TDAs, shrinks the overall addition to national savings.
Table 4. Effectiveness of Tax Incentives
No TDAs With TDAs
Age Overall($) Overall($) TDA($) Tax Loss($) New Savings(%)
21-30 2,844 4,167 1,623 695 39.1
31-40 2,062 4,997 4,430 1,372 35.5
41-50 3,497 6,787 6,089 1,430 30.5
51-60 2,298 3,602 3,977 991 8.1
61-65 -766 -1,563 -2,350 -1,052 -11.3
66-70 -1,166 -3,243 -1,890 195 —
71-80 -3,115 -4,977 -3,984 -1,622 —
81-90 -1,089 -2,034 -2,034 -596 —
Notes: 1. Negative values in column 4 represent tax gains. 2. Net new savings is defined as overall savings with
TDAs (col. 2) minus savings without TDAs (col. 1) and minus tax loss (col. 4), all divided by TDA savings (col. 3).
1.5.6 Retirement Effect of TDAs
The substitution effect, coming from the higher rate of return on TDAs, increases
wealth accumulation and reduces consumption compared to the case without TDAs
in the early phase of life cycle. One reason for this is that TDAs are utilized by
individuals who are planning on earlier retirement. Leisure choice is a function of
wealth, increasing with savings levels in both CSAs and TDAs, with the latter yielding
a stronger impact. Figure 6 plots the employment status for survivors in the cohort
and their financial resources to support retirement. Apparently, the higher pre-tax
rate of return on TDAs implies a stronger income effect in the later phase of life cycle,
which encourages more retirement. The fraction of survivors employed are lower in
the TDA case than in the benchmark. Consequently, the drop in labor supply means
less income. A considerable share of individuals now choose to claim Social Security
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earlier than otherwise since the earnings test is less likely to tax away income given
lower levels of labor earnings. In short, the tax advantage of TDAs enables individuals
to retire early. Social Security benefits serve as a complementary financial resource.
The finding that early retirement is encouraged by the introduction of TDAs should
be given consideration in the process of policy formulation. Such early retirement
does not necessarily add an immediate threat to the solvency of Social Security since,
as modeled in this chapter, the benefits are subject to approximately “actuarially
fair” adjustment so that early claimers get lower benefits and delayed retirees receive
higher benefits. However, as summarized by Gruber andWise (2005), early retirement
has substantial fiscal implications: it reduces tax revenue due to lower labor force
participation and increases expenditure due to the increasing number of retirees.




















  + TDAs























































Figure 6: Retirement Effect of TDAs
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1.5.7 Cost-Benefit Analysis of TDAs
Apparently, TDAs are welfare enhancing for households, since TDAs expand invest-
ment options and provide opportunities to accumulate wealth at pre-tax rate. As is
shown in the top panel in Figure 7, the indirect value function for households with
TDAs at all ages is above that without TDAs. TDAs at the same time carry cost in
terms of tax loss from the fiscal perspective. For the purpose of cost-benefit analysis,
I use the concept of equivalent variation (EV) to measure the welfare gain from TDAs
for households. Specifically, the equivalent variation is numerically computed as the
amount of extra CSA wealth required to make individuals without TDAs as well off
as with TDAs in the expected utility terms. This benefit (EV) is compared with the
fiscal cost, the present discounted value (PDV) of tax loss that is calculated as the
difference between tax revenue with and without TDAs. The bottom panel of Figure
7 shows such cost-benefit analysis. In the early phase of the life-cycle, the fiscal cost
outweighs the welfare gain. Put differently, there is room for Pareto improvement at
this stage: both individuals and the government would be better off if the govern-
ment gave individuals a lump sum transfer (in a magnitude smaller than the fiscal
cost and bigger than EV) instead of the TDA options. This is because the transfer
helps relax the budget constraint typically faced by workers in their 20’s-30’s. In the
later phase of the life-cycle, the welfare benefit induced by TDAs exceeds the cost.
This is because the tax deferral of TDAs offers effective means for retirement wealth
accumulation. The fiscal cost in this phase is substantially lower, thanks to the tax
recovery upon TDA withdrawals.
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Figure 7: Welfare and Cost-Benefit Analysis
1.6 Alternative Policies and Heterogeneity
1.6.1 Alternative Policies and Impact of TDAs
This section presents the impact of TDAs on saving and retirement behavior for dif-
ferent policy scenarios. Table 5 reports the results from assuming alternative policies.
First, assuming mandatory retirement and Social Security take-up at age 65 (experi-
ment 2), individuals in the model would save less in terms of dollar value than in the
case of flexible retirement choice. This implies higher consumption prior to retirement
since mandatory retirement yields higher cumulative lifetime earnings before age 65.
On the other hand, the fraction of TDA savings that represent new savings is now
substantially higher than in experiment 1. 20 This is because individuals contemplat-
20The assessment of new saving in experiment 2 is compared with a benchmark with mandatory
retirement at 65 but no TDAs.
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ing early retirement in mind would shift more savings from CSAs to TDAs. This
finding shows that the possibility of early retirement encourages tax-deferred savings
and national savings compared with the case of mandatory retirement, but with a
larger share of reshuffling of savings from CSAs to TDAs.
Second, an experiment is carried out to study how the bequest motive alters saving
profiles. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Hurd and Smith (1999), Dynan, Skinner and
Zeldes (1996), and De Nardi (2004) show that the bequest motive is an important
factor in explaining the upper tail of the wealth distribution. This experiment assumes
higher utility from bequest (κ = .4) as opposed to the modest bequest motive assumed
in experiment 1 (κ = .2). Not surprisingly, individuals would contribute more to
TDAs by reshuffling a larger part of CSA wealth compared with experiment 1, thus
yielding a lower share of new savings in TDAs.
Third, one may be concerned that a certain degree of employer intervention is embed-
ded in 401(k)s, which may significantly restrict individuals’ voluntary choices. I thus
narrow my definition of TDAs to include IRAs only, by decreasing the annual TDA
contribution limit to L = $4, 000, which is the total allowable amount in 2005 for
annual IRA contribution. A larger fraction of individuals in this case are restricted
by the contribution limits. Nevertheless, IRAs are still an effective means to solicit
new savings and to support early retirement.
Fourth, holding the contribution limit constant, a higher withdrawal penalty (τw =
.30) forces individuals to make TDA investments more conservatively. The role of
TDAs as a backup for emergency liquidity is undercut by the high penalty. Put
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differently, a larger CSA buffer is necessary before saving in TDAs is optimal.
Table 5. Alternative Policies and the Impact of TDAs
Ages 21-65 savings($k) Ages 21-90 savings($k)
Overall TDAs % New Overall TDAs % New
1. Bench. + TDAs 187.2 148.9 30.3 101.6 79.7 35.3
2. Mandatory at 65 184.3 137.3 43.1 86.4 64.2 65.2
3. Bequest (κ = .4) 189.8 150.9 29.5 104.3 82.1 34.7
4. L = $4, 000 170.4 127.0 27.5 93.1 67.6 34.4
5. τw = .30 181.5 142.1 29.0 96.3 72.2 35.7
1.6.2 Heterogeneity and impact of TDAs
To this point I have considered only how TDAs affect the mean behavior of house-
holds. Undoubtedly, there is tremendous heterogeneity among individuals. Table 6
and Figure 8 present findings along this line. First, TDAs have differential impacts
between high- and low-income groups. TDAs are more effective in stimulating new
savings for the top quintile than for the bottom quintile, with the fraction of new
savings being 51.7% and 1.8%, respectively. This is in line with the findings of Venti
and Wise (1991 and 1992) and Gale and Scholz (1994), who observe that households
with more wealth and higher income tend to make more contributions to IRAs. The
existence of TDAs generates a strong retirement effect on the rich despite the assump-
tion that high income earners (proxied by AIME) place a lower preference weight on
leisure compared with the poor. Many of them switch to part-time work and elect to
claim Social Security earlier than otherwise (Figure 8). The behavior of the poor, on
the other hand, is less altered by the introduction of TDAs for several reasons. First,
the poor have few resources available to take advantage of TDAs, and they derive less
benefit from tax deferral because they face lower marginal tax rates. Second, agents
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with low earnings attach more weight to the disutility of work, so they tend to retire
early even in the absence of TDAs. Third, poor agents tend to claim Social Security
early even absent TDAs, so there is no impact of TDAs on the claiming decision for
these workers.
Table 6. Heterogeneity and the Impact of TDAs
Ages 21-65 Savings($k) Ages 21-90 Savings($k)
Overall TDAs % New Overall TDAs % New
1. Bot 20% 52.8 26.9 -5.0 35.3 14.3 1.8
2. Top 20% 390.2 278.3 45.0 187.9 140.9 51.7
3. Impatience 23.0 1.2 -86.5 22.9 1.2 -88.9
4. Mortality 18.3 2.9 -81.6 15.0 2.7 -88.9
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Figure 8: TDAs and Income Heterogeneity
These results shed new light on the relationship between Social Security and retire-
ment. Rust and Phelan (1997) show that a drop in employment at age 62 is an optimal
response for liquidity constrained individuals since 62 is the earliest age for Social Se-
curity eligibility. The retirement and claiming decisions of the bottom quintile in
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this model confirm their findings. As for the rich, they will also retire early if they
have accumulated sufficient wealth, and they will optimally claim Social Security to
complement retirement financing, even though they do not face a cash shortage. This
model predicts that retirement can be encouraged by a public scheme - the creation
of TDAs. 21
Second, I explore how savings and retirement behavior would change in the case of
myopia, which is motivated by Feldstein (1985), who argues that “some individuals
lack the foresight to save for their retirement years (p.303)”. Complete myopia would
imply that individuals do not expect to retire and thus do no saving. This would imply
that TDAs are totally irrelevant to them. I thus introduce the more relevant case
of partial myopia, in which individuals give little weight to future utility, following
Feldstein. But I assume they correctly estimate future social security benefits, in
order to isolate the impact of TDAs. Here a higher subjective discount rate (β = .9)
is used to reflect such impatience. Impatient individuals usually claim Social Security
as their main financial source at 62. TDAs fail to solicit new savings from this group.
Not surprisingly, the net addition to national savings is negative since the income
effect dominates over the whole lifetime.
Third, the exercise is redone for the scenario in which mortality risk and average
earnings are strongly negatively related. Duggan, Singleton and Song (2005) suggests
that the mortality rate for those in top decile of AIME at age 62 is three times lower
than for those in lowest decile. This will affect the optimal time to claim Social
21This loosely echoes Feldstein (1974) who shows that Social Security induces retirement.
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Security. The simulations for the group of individuals with a high mortality rate
and low AIME reveal that they tend to retire early and claim Social Security at the
earliest eligible age, with or without TDAs. Similar to the case of impatience, TDAs
mainly boost consumption for groups with high mortality risk, yielding negative new
savings.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter combines the assessment of special savings plans with the study of
retirement behavior. I develop a quantitative and realistically calibrated model to
solve for optimal consumption/saving and leisure decisions of finitely lived individuals
who face mortality risk and stochastic earnings. Individuals are assumed to save for
liquidity reasons, for retirement and for bequests. They hold assets in conventional
savings and tax-deferred accounts. They also make endogenous labor supply and
retirement choices and a separate decision on the timing of Social Security take-up.
The simulations reveal that there is a functional division between CSAs and TDAs,
with the former serving mainly for liquidity and the latter for retirement and bequests.
The stronger the incentive to retire early, the more attractive is the TDA option.
Individuals who are contemplating early retirement tend to hold more savings in
terms of dollar value, shift a greater fraction of assets from CSAs to TDAs and have
a lower share of new net savings in TDAs than otherwise. The effectiveness of savings
incentives is also strengthened by the voluntary bequest motive.
There is tremendous heterogeneity with regard to the utilization of TDAs, retirement
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decisions, and Social Security claiming. The tax incentives are generally most effective
at stimulating new savings for the middle and upper income groups. The introduction
of TDAs appears to exert a bigger impact on their life-cycle behavior. The higher rate
of return on TDAs facilitates wealth accumulation, which consequently and perhaps
unintentionally encourages early retirement. Impatient and low-income individuals
tend to retire and claim Social Security early with or without TDAs. They contribute
much less to TDAs both because they face lower marginal tax rates and because
they have limited resources with which to take advantage of TDAs. For them, the
income effect dominates and TDAs fail to induce new savings. The finding that early
retirement is associated with TDAs should be given consideration in the process of
policy formulation. As summarized by Gruber and Wise (2005), early retirement has
substantial fiscal implications, since it reduces tax revenue due to lower labor force
participation and increases expenditure due to the increasing number of retirees,
despite the approximately “actuarially fair” adjustment of Social Security benefits.
There is no doubt about the increasing importance of tax deferred programs with
regard to national savings and individual retirement wealth security. They deserve
further study in various aspects. First, the newly induced savings will likely alter
the level of capital stock as well as factor prices. A general equilibrium model is a
natural step to quantify this second-round effect. Second, along with their popularity,
401(k) plans increasingly offer loans. It is worth exploring the effects of the universal
availability of pension loans on asset location choice and retirement wealth security.
These are on the agenda for future research.
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Appendix 1.A. The Derivation of Heuristic Findings
To derive some heuristic findings, I assume a flat and constant income tax at rate
τ , maintaining the assumptions that TDAs accrue tax free and are subject to early
withdrawal penalty. Allowing for a progressive tax system will strengthen the analysis
in the text. The stripped down version of the utility maximization problem and the






βt [Ψtu(ct, lt) + (1−Ψt)Γ(wt)] (A.1)
s.t.
µBt : at+1 = [1 + (1− τ)r]at + y(lt) + b
−(1− λtτw) [qt+1 − (1 + r)qt]− ct (A.2)
µLt : L > qt+1 − (1 + r)qt (A.3)
µat : at > 0 (A.4)
µqt : qt > 0 (A.5)
where wt = [1+ (1− τ)r)]at+(1+ r)qt is the terminal wealth bequeathed; and µ0s in
front of the constraints are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers.
1.A.1 Consumption
Plugging the expression for ct defined in the dynamic budget constraint into the
objective function and taking first order conditions w.r.t. at+1 and qt+1, respectively,






c(ct, lt) = β [1 + (1− τ)r]Et[ψt+1u0c(ct+1, lt+1)
+ (1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1)] +Etµat+1 (A.6)
qt+1 : (1− λtτw)u0c(ct, lt) = β(1 + r)Et[(1− λt+1τw)ψt+1u0c(ct+1, lt+1)
+ (1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1)]− µLt + (1 + r)EtµLt+1 +Etµqt+1 (A.7)
Combining the above two equations yields




Et[(1− λt+1τw)ψt+1u0c(ct+1, lt+1) + (1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1)]
1
1− λtτw
[−µLt + (1 + r)EtµLt+1 +Etµqt+1] (A.8)
This equation implies that an optimal interior asset allocation between CSAs and
TDAs is reached when a dollar contribution to CSAs or TDAs brings the same level of
marginal expected utility (otherwise a corner solution emerges, so that contributions
will be made in only one type of account). An interesting special case arises when an
individual contributes to TDAs at t (hence λt = 0) and future withdrawals are not
subject to penalty (i.e. λt+1 = 0 with probability one). Then the above equation is
reduced to the following. See text for the interpretation.
βτrEt[ψt+1u
0





t − (1 + r)EtµLt+1 −Etµqt+1 (A.9)
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1.A.2 Saving Rules
Let V (Λt) denote the indirect utility realized at t given the beginning-of-period states
Λt = (t, at, et, qt, εt, z
s
t ). Taking derivatives to V (Λt) w.r.t. at and qt, respectively,
and applying the Envelope Theorem produces the following equations.
V 0a (Λt) = [1 + r(1− τ)][µBt + β(1− ψt)Γ0(wt)] + µat (A.10)
V 0q (Λt) = (1 + r)[µ
B
t (1− λtτw) + β(1− ψt)Γ0(wt) + µLt ] + µqt (A.11)
Shifting these equations forward by one year gives the expected marginal value of
savings in the two accounts, respectively.
EtV
0
a (Λt+1) = [1 + r(1− τ)]Et[µBt+1 + β(1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1)] +Etµat+1 (A.12)
EtV
0
q (Λt+1) = (1 + r)Et[µ
B
t+1(1− λt+1τw)
+β(1− ψt+1)Γ0(wt+1) + µLt+1] +Etµqt+1 (A.13)
1.A.3 Retirement Effect of TDAs
Taking first order condition to the utility maximization problem w.r.t. leisure lt yields
u0l(ct, lt) = −u0c(ct, lt)y0(lt) (A.14)
where y0(lt) < 0. This equation facilitates implementing comparative statics on op-
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It is straightforward to show that u00lc = 0 and u
00
cc < 0 given the period utility and
bequest functions and γ > 1. Also, it is reasonable to assume that y00(lt) > 0, which















which is particularly true when withdrawals take place at age t > tf (i.e. λt = 0).
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Appendix 1.B. The Solution Method
Given the large number of state and choice variables, numerical method is used to
solve the model. The computation begins by discretizing the space of the continuous
state variables, i.e., CSA assets, a, TDA assets, q, and AIME, e. The discretization
yields denser grid points at lower values and coarser points towards the upper end,
which is to accommodate the potential nonlinearity and sensitivities in decision rules.
I first solve the trivial maximization problem for age T , the last period, where indi-
viduals simply divide wealth between consumption and bequest. The value function
is derived as V (ΛT ). Then the computation moves backward to solve for the optimal
decisions and the value function for age T − 1. If the realized assets do not lie on the
grids on which the expected value function is defined, linear interpolations are imple-
mented. This backward induction continues until the starting age is reached. Along
the process, the optimal decisions are recorded for all feasible realizations of random
variables (earnings and mortality) given initial states. Policy functions are thus de-
fined as at+1 = f(t, at, et, qt, εt, zst ), and qt+1 = f(t, at, et, qt, εt, z
s
t ), for t = 20, ..., T.
The fully-loaded model requires tremendous computational resources, including those
granted by the Pittsburgh Supercomputer Center. The computation is run in par-
allel on a large number of computers, using the Message Passing Interface (MPI)
standard. In each decision-making age, the up-to-date value functions and a subset
of state variables are passed on to each parallel processor for evaluation. The newly
derived value functions and decision rules are gathered and to be collectively shared
next period.
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With optimal decision rules derived, large scale simulations are carried out to generate
life-cycle profiles of earnings, savings, labor supply, and Social Security. Simulations
start with age 21 when individuals are endowed with no assets. They make optimal
choices based on policy and value functions derived above. Values of random variables
are generated by Monte Carlo method. Simulations move forward until end of the
life cycle.
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EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC SPENDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 






This chapter attempts quantitatively to measure the efficiency of public spending in 
developing countries. The efficiency is defined as the distance between observed input-
output combinations and an efficiency frontier. Both input- and output- efficiencies are 
estimated for several health and education output indicators by means of the Free 
Disposable Hull (FDH) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques. This chapter 
further seeks to verify empirical regularities associated with cross-country efficiency 
variation. The panel Tobit regressions reveal that countries are more likely to register 
lower efficiency if they are faced with higher government expenditure levels, larger wage 
shares in government budget composition, higher ratios of public to private financing in 
service provision (health), more prevalence of HIV/AIDS epidemic (health), stronger 
external aid dependency, and/or higher income inequality (education). Though no 
causality may be inferred from these exercises, they help point at different factors to 
understand why some countries spend more resources than others to achieve similar 
educational and health outcomes. 
 
                                                 
23 This chapter is based on the joint work with Santiago Herrera, who is affiliated with the World Bank. 
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2.1   Introduction 
 
Government spending in developing countries frequently account for a large share of 
GDP. Small changes in the efficiency of public spending can have a significant impact on 
the attainment of the government’s objectives. The first challenge faced by stakeholders 
is to measure efficiency. This chapter attempts such quantification on a most 
comprehensive set of indicators on education and health, which are largely publicly 
financed in developing countries. Given the observation that relatively rich countries tend 
to face higher price levels, public spending as an input is orthogonalized against income 
level. This approach was not previously explored in the literature and is more accurate, in 
terms of goodness-of-fit, to capture the true efficiency variation across countries. The 
exercises reveal the efficiency positioning of countries. In a second stage, this chapter 
seeks to identify empirical regularities associated with the variation in the estimated 
efficiency scores. Several policy and environmental variables are found significantly 
relevant by means of a panel Tobit regression model, which allows for the fact that the 
efficiency scores are distributed over a limited interval between zero and one.  
This chapter has four sections following this Introduction. Section 2.2 outlines the 
methodology that defines inefficiency as the distance from the observed input-output 
combinations to an efficiency frontier. This frontier, defined as the maximum attainable 
output for a given input level or the minimum input required for a certain output level, is 
estimated using the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
techniques. The exercises focus on health and education expenditure because they 
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frequently constitute large shares of government budgets and because a lack of data 
prevents international comparisons in other types of expenditures. 
Section 2.3 estimates the efficiency frontiers for nine education output indicators and four 
health output indicators, based on a sample of 140 countries. Both input-efficiency 
(excess input consumption to achieve a level of output) and output-efficiency (output 
shortfall for a given level of input) are scored. The section presents both the single input-
single-output and the multiple-input multiple-output frameworks. In addition, it explores 
how technical efficiency has changed over time.  
Section 2.4 seeks to identify empirical regularities that explain variations in the efficiency 
scores over time and across countries. The panel Tobit regression analysis reveals that 
higher government expenditure is generally associated with lower efficiency scores. 
Similarly, countries in which the wage bill forms a larger share of the total budget tend to 
have lower efficiency scores. Three other variables that explain efficiency variations are 
the degree of urbanization (positively correlated with efficiency, the prevalence of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic (negatively associated with efficiency scores), and inequality in 
income distribution (higher inequality associated with lower efficiency).  
Section 2.5 gives concluding remarks. 
 
2.2   Measuring Efficiency: Methodologies and Literature Review 
 
This section briefly describes the methods that are applied in this chapter to measure 
efficiency and the literature that is directly related to the analysis of public expenditure 
efficiency. Empirical and theoretical measures of output efficiency are based on ratios of 
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observed output levels to the maximum that could have been obtained given the inputs 
utilized, while the measure of input efficiency is based on the ratio of minimum input to 
the observed input given same level of output. This maximum (minimum) constitutes the 
efficiency frontier which will be the benchmark for measuring the relative efficiency of 
the observations. There are multiple techniques to estimate this frontier, as surveyed by 
Murillo-Zamorano (2004), and they have been recently applied to examine the efficiency 
of public spending.  
 
2.2.1 Methods for Measuring Efficiency 
 
The origin of the modern discussion of efficiency measurement dates back to Farell 
(1957), who identified two different ways in which productive agents could be 
inefficient: one, they could use more inputs than technically required to obtain a given 
level of output, or two, they could use a sub-optimal input combination given the input 
prices and their marginal productivities. The first type of inefficiency is termed technical 
inefficiency while the second one is known as allocative inefficiency. 
These two types of inefficiency can be represented graphically by means of the unit 
isoquant curve in Figure 9. The set of minimum inputs required for a unit of output lies 
on the isoquant curve YY’. An agent’s input-output combination defined by bundle P 
produces one unit of output using input X1 and X2. Since the same output can be achieved 
by consuming less of both inputs along the radial back to bundle M, the segment MP 
represents the inefficiency in resource utilization. The input-oriented technical efficiency 
measure (TE) is therefore defined as TE = OM/OP. Furthermore, the producer could 
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achieve additional cost reduction by choosing a different input combination. The least 
cost combination of inputs that produces one unit of output is given by point T, where the 
marginal rate of technical substitution is equal to the input price ratio. To achieve this 
cost level implicit in the optimal combination of inputs, input use needs to be contracted 
















Figure 9 Technical and Allocative Inefficiency 
 
The focus of this chapter is on technical efficiency, given the lack of comparable input 
prices across countries. This concept of efficiency is narrower than the one implicit in 
social welfare analysis. That is, we abstract from the consideration that countries may be 
producing the wrong output very efficiently at low cost (as discussed by Tanzi, 2004).  
Various techniques have been developed over the past decades to tackle the challenge of 
estimating the unknown and unobservable efficiency frontier (i.e. the isoquant YY’ in 
Figure 9). The widely used taxonomies classify the estimation methods into parametric or 
non-parametric, and stochastic or deterministic catalogs. The parametric approach 











as well as for the inefficiency term incorporated in the deviation of the observed values 
from the frontier. The non-parametric approach calculates the frontier directly from the 
data without imposing specific functional restrictions. The former approach is based on 
econometric methods, while the latter uses mathematical programming techniques. The 
deterministic approach assumes all deviations from the frontier explained by inefficiency, 
while the stochastic approach considers those deviations as a combination of inefficiency 
and random shocks out of the control of decision makers. 
This chapter uses deterministic non-parametric methods to avoid assuming specific 
functional forms for the relationship between inputs and outputs or for the inefficiency 
terms. Specifically, two methods are utilized in measuring efficiency: Free Disposable 
Hull (FDH) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The FDH method imposes the least 
restrictions on the data as it only assumes free disposability of resources. Figure 10 
illustrates the single-input single-output FDH production possibility frontier. Country A 
and country B use inputs XA and XB to produce outputs YA and YB, respectively. The 
input efficiency score for country B is defined as the quotient XA/XB. The output 
efficiency score is given by the quotient YB/YA. A score of one implies that the country is 
on the frontier, while a score less than one implies inefficiency. An input efficiency score 
of 0.75, for instance, indicates that this particular country uses inputs in excess of the 
most efficient producer by 25 percent to achieve the same output level. An output 
efficiency score of 0.75 indicates that the inefficient producer attains 75 percent of the 
output obtained by the most efficient producer with the same input intake. Efficiency for 
multiple inputs and outputs can be defined in an analogous way. Formally, the efficiency 
of multiple inputs and multiple outputs calculated as follows. Let X and Y be the vectors 
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containing I inputs and J outputs, respectively. Let N be the set of countries that are more 
efficient than country 0, with 0iin XX ≤  and 0jjn YY ≥ , where inX  is the i-th type of input 
used and jnY  is the j-th type of output produced by country n. The input efficiency for 

































Figure 10 Free Disposal Hull (FDH) production possibility frontier 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) assumes that linear combinations of the observed 
input-output bundles are feasible. Hence it assumes convexity of the production set to 
construct an envelope around the observed combinations. Figure 11 illustrates the single 
input-single output DEA production possibility frontier. In contrast to the vertical step-
ups of FDH frontier, DEA frontier is a piecewise linear locus connecting all the efficient 
decision-making units (DMUs). The feasibility assumption, assuming piecewise linearity, 
implies that the efficiency of C, for instance, is not only ranked against the real 
performers A and D, called the peers of C in the literature, but also evaluated relative to a 
virtual decision maker, V, which employs a weighted collection of A and D inputs to 













FDH, is now inefficient by DEA ranking, lying below the efficiency frontier XADF 
(which reflects variable returns to scale, explained below). This example shows that FDH 
tends to assign efficiency to more DMUs than DEA does. The input-oriented technical 
















Figure 11 DEA production possibility frontier 
 
When constant returns to scale (CRS) characterize the production set, the frontier may be 
represented by a ray extending from the origin through the efficient DMU (ray OA). By 
this standard, only A would be rated efficient. The important feature of the XADF 
frontier is that this frontier reflects variable returns to scale (VRS). The segment XA 
reflects locally increasing returns to scale (IRS), that is, an increase in the inputs results 
in a greater than proportionate increase in output. Segments AD and DF reflect 
decreasing returns to scale. It is worth noticing that the constant returns to scale technical 
efficiency (CRSTE) is equal to the product of variable returns to scale technical 
efficiency (VRSTE) and scale efficiency (SE). Accordingly, DMU D is technically 

















scale efficient. The scale efficiency of C is calculated as YN/YV. 24  The technical 
Appendix 2.A provides more detailed exploration of Data Envelopment Analysis, which 
shows how peers are identified, how the virtual DMUs are constructed, and how weights 
to the different efficient DMUs and efficiency scores are calculated. 
The limitations of non-parametric methods derive mostly from the sensitivity of the 
results to sampling variability and to the presence of outliers. This has led some literature 
to apply tighter statistical analysis to the non-parametric methods (Simar and Wilson, 
2000). For instance, confidence intervals for the efficiency scores can be estimated using 
asymptotic theory in the single input case (for input-efficiency) or single-output case (for 
output efficiency), given that these can be shown to be maximum likelihood estimators 
(Banker, 1993 and Grosskopf, 1996). For multiple input-output cases the distribution of 
the efficiency estimators is unknown or quite complicated and analysts recommend 
constructing the empirical distribution of the scores by the means of bootstrapping 
methods (Simar and Wilson, 2000). Other solutions to outliers or noisy data consist of 
constructing a frontier that does not envelop all the data points, building an expected 
minimum input function or expected maximum output function (Cazals, Florens and 
Simar, 2002, and Wheelock and Wilson, 2003). 
 
2.2.2 Literature Review  
 
There is a large literature measuring productive efficiency of diverse types of decision 
making units. For instance, there are studies on the efficiency of museums (Bishop and 
                                                 
24 See Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984), among others, for 
further exploration of returns to scale. 
 67
Brand, 2003), container terminals (Cullinane and Song, 2003), electric generation plants 
(Cherchye and Post 2001), banks (Wheelock and Wilson, 2003), schools (Worthington, 
2001) and hospitals (Bergess and Wilson, 1998). Relatively fewer papers, however, 
analyze aggregate public sector spending efficiency using cross-country data. The 
following is a brief overview of them. 
Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) employ the input-oriented FDH approach to assess the 
efficiency of government spending on education and health in 37 African countries in 
1984-1995. They find that African countries are on average inefficient in providing 
education and health services relative to both Asian and Western Hemisphere countries. 
They report an increase in the productivity of spending over time, as reflected in outward 
shifts in the efficiency frontier. The authors report a negative relationship between the 
input efficiency scores and the level of public spending, which leads them to conclude 
that higher educational attainment and health output requires efficiency improvement 
more than increased budgetary allocations. 
Evans and Tandon (2000) adopt a parametric approach to measuring output efficiency of 
national health systems for the World Health Organization, running a fixed effects panel 
regression on 191 countries for the period 1993-1997. Health output is measured by the 
disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE) index, while health expenditures (public and 
private aggregated) and the average years of schooling of the adult population are 
considered as inputs. The output-efficiency score is defined as the ratio of actual 
performance to the potential maximum. The authors introduce quadratic terms of the 
inputs, arguing that they are a second-order Taylor-series approximation to an unknown 
functional form. The significance of these terms may be an indication of the importance 
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of non-linearity. It may also reflect neglected dynamics or heterogeneity in the sample, 
given that both developed and developing nations are included. 25  An interesting 
contribution of the paper is a construction of a confidence interval for the efficiency 
estimates through a Monte-Carlo procedure. The authors document a positive relationship 
between the efficiency scores and the level of spending. The more efficient health 
systems are those of Oman, Chile and Costa Rica, while the least efficient countries are 
all African: Zimabawe, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi and Lesotho. 
Jarasuriya and Woodon (2002) also adopt a parametric approach to estimating output 
efficiency of health and education provision in a sample of developing countries. The 
authors consider separately an educational attainment indicator (net primary enrollment) 
and a health output indicator (life expectancy) and estimate a functional linear 
relationship between these output indicators and three inputs: per capita GDP, spending 
per-capita, and the adult literacy rate. Their panel estimations reveal no relationship 
between expenditure and the educational or health outputs when per-capita GDP is 
included as an input. They conclude that spending more is not guaranteed to produce 
better education or health results. The authors do not point at the correlation between the 
two variables (i.e. per-capita GDP and per-capita spending) as a possible cause of this 
problem, which is discussed in the next section. The countries with the lowest efficiency 
are all African: Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Ethiopia for the case of health and 
Ethiopia, Niger, and Burkina Faso for education. The authors go further to explain the 
cross-country variation in efficiency and find that the degree of urbanization and the 
quality of bureaucracy are the most relevant variables. To capture possible non-linearity, 
they introduce quadratic terms of these variables. This stage of their work poses several 
                                                 
25 See Haque, Pesaran and Sharma (1999) for an econometric illustration. 
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problems. First, it is possible that the non-linear terms reflect heterogeneity across 
countries and dynamics across time. As shown by Haque, Pesaran, and Sharma (1999), 
this would produce inconsistent estimates. Second, the authors do not adjust for the fact 
that the dependent variable (efficiency scores) is censored, given that it can adopt only 
values between zero and one.  
Greene (2003a) concentrates on health efficiency using the WHO panel data and makes 
an effort to explain inefficiency variations. He first estimates a health production function 
using expenditure (public plus private) and education as input. His stochastic frontier 
estimation allows for time variation of the coefficients and heterogeneity in the countries’ 
sensitivity to explanatory variables. He then attempts to explain inefficiency with a set of 
explanatory variables of which the significant ones are the income inequality measure, 
GDP per capita and a dummy variable for tropical location.  
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) examine the efficiency of public spending in 23 
OECD countries using a non-parametric approach. They construct a composite indicator 
of public sector performance capturing quality of administrative functions, educational 
and health attainment, and the quality of infrastructure. Taking the performance indicator 
as the output and total public spending as the input, they perform single-input, single-
output FDH to rank the expenditure efficiency of the sample. Their results show that 
countries with smaller public sectors exhibit higher overall performance.  
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) address the efficiency of expenditure in education and 
health by applying both DEA and FDH to a sample of OECD countries, which is 
different from our focus on developing countries. The small overlap of the samples limits 
the direct comparability of the results.  
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2.3   Empirical Estimation of Efficiency 
 
2.3.1 Assumptions and Limitations 
 
Cross-country efficiency comparisons assume some homogeneity across the world in the 
production technology of health and education. There are two particular aspects in which 
the homogeneity assumption is important. First, the comparison assumes that a small 
number of factors are commonly used for production across countries. Any omission of 
an important factor will yield as a result a high efficiency ranking of the country that uses 
more of the omitted input. Second, the comparison requires that the quality of the inputs 
is more or less the same, with the efficiency scores biased in favor of countries where the 
quality is of higher grade. 
Factor heterogeneity will not be a problem as long as it is evenly distributed across 
countries. It will be problematic if there are differences between countries in the average 
quality of a factor (Farrell, 1957). Our study is not immune to this limitation, given that 
the main input in both production technologies is used more intensively in richer 
countries (with higher per-capita GDP).  The main input is public spending per capita on 
education and health measured in constant 1995 US dollars in PPP terms. A clear positive 
association between this variable and per-capita GDP can be verified in Figure 12. 
This positive association between expenditure and the level of economic development (as 
measured by per-capita-GDP) may be explained by several reasons. One of them could 
be the Balassa-Samuelson effect, according to which price levels in wealthier countries 
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tend to be higher than in poorer countries.26 This applies to both final goods and factor 
prices. Thus price of the same service (health or education, for instance) will be higher in 
the country with higher GDP. Similarly, wages in the relatively richer countries are 
higher, given the higher marginal productivity of labor, which will tend to increase costs, 
especially in labor-intensive activities such as health and education. 
Figure 12 can also be interpreted as evidence of the validity of Wagner’s hypothesis at 
the cross-country level. This hypothesis postulates that there is a tendency for 
governments to increase their activities as economic activity increases either because the 
rising complexity associated with economic development requires more governmental 
activity or because the income elasticity of demand for publicly provided services, in 
particular education is greater than one. This hypothesis has been tested econometrically 
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Figure 12 Public Expenditure and GDP (both per capita and in log) 
 
                                                 
26 The Balassa-Samuelson effect refers to the fact that price levels are higher in richer countries than in 
poorer countries.  It can be shown that relative wages and prices are a function of the marginal productivity 
of labor in the traded goods. Given higher capital abundance in the richer countries, the productivity of 
labor tends to be higher in these countries, and hence will be wages and prices. 
 72
Previous studies on the efficiency of public spending recognized the positive association 
reflected in Figure 12 and suggested alternative solutions. One possibility is to split the 
sample by groups of countries (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001). This chapter in part follows 
this approach by excluding the industrialized nations from the sample and by presenting 
most of the results clustered regionally (Africa (AFR), East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Latin 
America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle-East and North Africa (MNA) and South Asia 
(SAS)). 27  A second alternative incorporates per-capita GDP directly as a factor of 
production, jointly with expenditure and other inputs (Jarasuriya and Woodon 2002). The 
problem with this approach lies in the difficulty in disentangling the effects of these two 
variables, besides the burden in justifying GDP per capita as an input for production.  
Here we explore a third option, which consists in using as an input the component of 
public expenditure orthogonal to GDP.28 The orthogonalized expenditure is the residual 
of a linear regression of pubic expenditure on GDP per capita. We calculate efficiency 
using as inputs both the original expenditure and the orthogonalized component. The 
goodness-of-fit is gauged based on the frequency distribution of the efficiency measures, 
as suggested by Farrell (1957) and Varian (1990). Comparing the efficiency distributions 
(Figure 13a-b) apparently reveals that the orthogonalized expenditure version produces 
distributions that are not skewed towards extreme inefficient outcomes. On this basis, the 
chapter hereafter uses the orthogonal component of expenditure on health and education 
as an input. 
 
                                                 
27 Appendix 2.C provides the list of countries included in this study and their geographical regions. 
 
28 Since residuals may take positive and negative values, the variable is right-shifted to avoid negative 



























(a) Unorthogonalized Public Expenditure (b) Orthogonalized Public Expenditure 
 
Figure 13 Density of Efficiency Scores – Gross Primary School Enrollment 
 
Besides public expenditure, input variables include literacy of adult and ratio of teachers 
to students for the study on education, and literacy of adult and private spending for the 
study on health. This chapter uses nine indicators of education output and four indicators 
of health output.29  The education indicators are: primary school enrollment (gross and 
net), secondary school enrollment (gross and net), literacy of youth, average years of 
schooling, first level complete, second level complete, and learning scores. Learning 
scores, which are believed by many to reflect educational attainment accurately, are not 
generally available for a large number of developing countries, limiting their applicability 
to international comparison. Crouch and Fasih (2004) make a recent and useful 
reconciliation of several international assessments to construct a larger sample.30 The 
correlation coefficients between the learning scores and other output variables are high, 
                                                 
29 A complete list of variables and data sources can be found in Table 2.C.2 of Appendix 2.C. The main 
data sources are: the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), Barro-Lee database, Crouch and 
Fasih (2004), and the World Health Organization (Mathers et al, 2000).  
 
30 Crouch and Fasih (2004) consider several international tests of learning achievement in math, science 
and literacy applied at different levels of the school system. The tests include: TIMSS (Third International 
Mathematics and Science Survey), PIRLS (Progress in International Literacy Study), PISA (Program for 
International Student Assessment), Reading Literacy Study, LLECE, SACMEQ (Southern Africa 
Consortium for Monitoring of Education Quality), and MLA (Monitoring Learning Achievement).  
 74
as shown in Figure 14 (.81 with net secondary school enrollment and .76 with average 
years of schooling). 31  The health output indicators are: life expectancy at birth, 
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Figure 14 Correlation between Learning Scores and Other Education Indicators 
 
Four limitations of the analysis arise from these particular data sources: First, there is a 
slight inconsistency in the level of aggregation. This chapter uses aggregate public 
spending on health and education, while using disaggregate measures of output such as 
primary enrollment or secondary enrollment. Ideally, the input should use separately 
public spending on primary and secondary education. Similarly, health care spending 
could be disaggregated into primary level and secondary level care. The data could be 
disaggregated even further to analyze efficiency at the school or hospital levels. Second, 
there are omitted factors of production.  This is especially true in education, as this 
chapter does not consider private spending due to lack of data for developing nations. If 
this factor is used more intensively in a particular group of countries, the efficiency 
                                                 
31 The correlations and Figure 14 exclude developed nations from the Crouch and Fasih (2004) sample. 
 
32 DPT stands for Diphtheria-Pertussis and Tetanus 
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scores would be biased favoring efficiency in that group. The third limitation is the 
combination of monetary and non-monetary factors of production. In addition to public 
expenditure, this chapter uses non-monetary factors of production such as the ratio of 
teachers to students in the case of education, and literacy of adults in the case of both 
health and education. Other factors of production that could have been used are the 
physical number of teaching hours (in education) or the number of doctors or in-patient 
beds (in health), as done by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) for the OECD countries. 
However, non-existent data for a large number of developing countries constrained the 
options. The fourth limitation is that the selected indicators do not allow for a good 
differentiation between outputs and outcomes. For instance, most of the indicators of 
education, such as completion and enrollment rates, do not measure how much learning is 
taking place in a particular country. In education, this chapter contributes by considering 
learning scores as one of the indicators. In health, other outcomes such as the number of 
sick-day leaves or the number of missed-school days due to health-related causes could 
be important reflections of outcomes. Two of the selected health output indicators, DPT 
and measles immunizations, are delivered in vertical programs, that is, in campaigns that 
are relatively independent of basic health systems and therefore may not be sufficient 
indicators of the actual quality of the health system. Finally, the fact that life expectancy 
is influenced by diet, lifestyle, sanitation, and a clean environment which are not included 




2.3.2 Single Input Single Output Results  
 
2.3.2.1 FDH and DEA analysis: Education 
We start with estimating the efficiency scores and frontiers for education and health 
based on the average input and output values over 1996-2002. We turn to multiple 
periods later.  Figure 15a-d show both FDH and DEA estimation of the efficiency frontier 
for three of the nine output indicators: gross primary school enrollment, first level 
complete and learning scores. Individual country efficiency scores for the three indicators 
are reported in Tables 2.D.1-3 of Appendix 2.D. The graphical efficiency frontiers for 
other output indicators can be found in Appendix 2.D (Figure 2.D. 1). 
Figure 15d, in contrast to Figure 15c, illustrates the efficiency frontier for the learning 
scores if the developed countries are included in the sample, demonstrating the sensitivity 
of the results to the sample selection. This fact is acute in the case of learning scores 
which capture the quality dimension of education that no other indicator captures. While 
in the sample of developing countries Chile, Hungary and the Czech Republic are on the 
frontier in Figure 15c, once the developed nations are included they appear inefficient. 
The complete set of efficiency scores can be found in Tables 2.D.2-3 in Appendix 2.D 






                                                 
33 Figure 15d excludes Japan, Korea, Ireland and Belgium to facilitate comparisons. 
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Figure 15 Education Efficiency Frontier: Single Input and Single Output 
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Several results from the FDH and DEA analyses on education are worth highlighting: 
a. The rankings are generally robust to the output indicators selected. This can be 
verified by the Spearman rank-correlation coefficients (see Tables 2.E.1 and 2.E.2 
in Appendix 2.E). They are all positive, significant and high. The range oscillates 
from a minimum of .53 to a maximum of .94, with a mean of .70. This result 
implies that countries appearing efficient (or inefficient) according to one 
indicator are ranked similarly when another output indicator is used.  
b. Despite the orthogonalization by GDP, the relatively rich countries tend to be in 
the less efficient group, i.e. countries with higher per-capita GDP spend more than 
other countries in attaining similar education outcomes. Higher spending may 
reflect the higher cost of tertiary education. This is a factor that may help explain 
the positioning of Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Oil-rich countries, such as Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia, tend to be in the group of inefficient producers. 
c. Another group of relatively inefficient producers are those with “average” 
expenditure levels but extremely low education attainment. Among those are 
mostly African countries (Angola, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Ethiopia), 
some Middle Eastern countries (Djibouti, and Yemen) and South Asian countries 
(Bangladesh and Pakistan). Tables 2.D.1-3 in Appendix 2.D list the output-
efficiency scores for three of the indicators. 
d. Output-efficiency rankings also vary with the selected output indicators. The 
Spearman correlation coefficients of the output-efficiency scores (see Tables 
2.E.3 and 2.E.4 in Appendix 2.E) show that these are robust to the selected 
indicators, though the mean of the correlation coefficients is lower (.52) and the 
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range is somewhat wider (.30 to .95) than those registered in the input-efficiency 
rankings. 
e. In an attempt to identify clusters of more efficient (inefficient) countries, the top 
(and bottom) 10 percent of the efficiency rankings are selected for each of the 
indicators. If a country appears in the efficient (inefficient) tail for three or more 
of the indicators, it is included in Table 7. This clustering exercise reveals a group 
of African countries as the most inefficient. Two oil-rich countries appear in this 
group as well. Among the more efficient group of countries we consistently find 
Uruguay, Korea, Bahamas, and Bahrain. Why these countries cluster in particular 
sets requires more in-depth analysis and explanation. The last section of this 
chapter attempts to associate efficiency results with some explanatory variables. 
Table 7 Educational Attainment: Single Input, Single Output 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Most efficient Uruguay, Korea, Dominican 
Republic, Indonesia, Guatemala, 
China, Bahamas, Bahrain, El 
Salvador 
Uruguay, Korea, Bahrain, 
Bahamas 
Least efficient Botswana, South Africa, Kuwait, 
Tunisia, Lesotho, Barbados,  
Saudi Arabia, Zimbawe, 
Namibia, Malaysia, St. Lucia, 
Jamaica,  St. Vincent, Latvia 
Niger, Mali,  Tanzania,  
Burkina Fasso, Gunea-
Bissau, Ethiopia, Guinea,  
Burundi, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, Chad 
 
f. To grasp the magnitude of deviations from the efficiency frontier, we computed 
an average for all indicators for the inefficient countries.  The input-efficiency 
estimations indicate that the most inefficient decile could reach the same 
educational attainment levels by spending approximately 50 percent less. The 
 80
output efficiency estimators indicate that, on average, with their expenditure level 
this group could reach educational attainment levels four times as high. 
g. It is critical to note that even if a country appears efficient, there might still be a 
significant discrepancy between the observed output level and the socially desired 
or target output level. For instance, Bahamas, Bahrain, Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala appear on the efficiency frontier or very close to it (Figure 15a.1).  
However, these countries are still far away from where Gabon and Brazil are, and 
it could be desirable to achieve those target enrollment rates. Guatemala spends 
about two percent of GDP on education but has a net secondary enrollment rate 
below 40 percent and a net primary enrollment around 80 percent (Figure 2.D. 1 
in Appendix 2.D). It would be difficult to argue that these are desirable outcomes 
although they are very close to the input-oriented efficiency frontier. Similarly, 
though Chile appears efficient with learning scores of about 400, the country 
could still achieve higher learning scores of over 500 points at the cost of slightly 
higher public spending. What is critical is to make sure that the country moves 
along the efficiency frontier to the higher target output level. Countries can as 
well exploit scale economies if they are operating in the increasing returns to 
scale zone of production (output levels smaller than that of point A in Figure 11). 
h. The regional aggregation of the efficiency scores by each individual output 
indicator shows that scores are lower when they are input oriented (Table 8) than 
output oriented (Table 9).34 This is especially true for ECA. The exception is 
Africa. Higher efficiency scores are generally observed when primary enrollment 
                                                 
34 The regional aggregation is computed as the simple average of individual country scores obtained for the 
whole sample. The scores are not computed by constructing separate efficiency frontiers for each region. 
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is considered as the output indicator than in the case of secondary enrollment, 
especially when output-oriented measures are considered. Africa and MNA have 
similar levels of input inefficiency: in most cases, both regions have public 
spending 35 percent in excess of the benchmark cases. EAP, ECA, LAC and SAS, 
on average, spend between 20-30 percent in excess of the benchmark level.  
Table 8 Educational Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by region 
- Single Input, Single Output 
 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS 
Gross primary enrollment .69 .74 .67 .74 .65 .75 
Net primary enrollment .68 .78 .72 .77 .68 .71 
Gross Secondary enrollment .65 .69 .67 .69 .63 .70 
Net secondary enrollment .64 .71 .71 .69 .64 .72 
Average years of school .21 .36 .37 .32 .18 .25 
First level complete .21 .43 .48 .36 .20 .26 
Second level complete .22 .37 .33 .32 .19 .27 
Literacy of youth .66 .73 .86 .72 .63 .72 
Table 9 Educational Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by region 
- Single Input-Single Output 
 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS 
Gross primary enrollment .62 .79 .72 .82 .67 .72 
Net primary enrollment .64 .93 .90 .93 .79 .78 
Gross Secondary enrollment .23 .50 .70 .61 .54 .39 
Net secondary enrollment .26 .58 .84 .66 .60 .44 
Average years of school .32 .63 .79 .60 .53 .38 
First level complete .19 .49 .50 .36 .22 .20 
Second level complete .09 .37 .38 .24 .26 .22 
Literacy of youth .72 .95 .99 .94 .88 .66 
 
2.3.2.2 FDH and DEA Analysis: Health 
This subsection considers the efficiency of pubic spending on health, in the case of one 
input (public expenditure on health per capita in PPP terms) and four alternative output 
indicators: life expectancy at birth, DPT immunization, measles immunization, and the 
disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE) which takes into account both mortality and 
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illness. The efficiency frontier for each indicator is computed using both the FDH and 
DEA methodologies. Figure 16a-d show the efficiency frontiers. The specific country 
rankings for two of the health indicators are listed in Table 2.D.4 of Appendix 2.D.  
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Figure 16 Health Efficiency Frontier: Single Input and Single Output 
 
Several results from the efficiency analysis on health spending may be highlighted:  
a. The input efficiency scores obtained for each of the output indicators are highly 
correlated. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient oscillates between .66 
and .94, with a mean of 0.81 (see Tables 2.E.1 and 2.E.2 in Appendix 2.E). This 
indicates that the efficiency ranking is very similar regardless of the output 
indicator being used. 
b. Despite the orthogonalization by GDP the relatively rich countries tend to be in 
the less efficient group. The group of inefficient producers cluster in two groups 
of countries: one group of relatively rich countries like the Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary that have large expenditure but not substantially 
high output (input inefficiency) and another group of countries that spend 
relatively little but whose output could be substantially larger, like Sierra Leone, 
Namibia, Zimbawe and Lesotho (output efficiency). The rankings between input 
and output orientations are highly correlated (Tables 2.E.3-2.E.4 in Appendix 2.E). 
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c. The most efficient and least efficient countries are listed in Table 10. The 
selection criterion is the same as in Table 7. The group of least efficient countries 
could, on average, increase output significantly for a given expenditure level. For 
instance, the least efficient countries could almost double the disability-adjusted 
life expectancy (DALE) index to achieve the same efficiency as the benchmark. 
Similarly the DPT immunization would have to triple to achieve the same 
efficiency level as the benchmark developing countries. 
d. The regional aggregation of the efficiency scores by each individual output 
indicator shows that input efficiency scores (Table 11) tend to be lower than 
output efficiency scores (Table 12). This is especially true in ECA, LAC and 
MNA, and to a lesser extent in EAP and SAS. In Africa, both scores are strikingly 
similar, indicating that, on average, the region spends about 35 percent in excess 
of the benchmark countries to achieve the same output level. Alternatively, the 
output level is 35 percent below that of efficient countries that use the same input 
(expenditure) level.  
Table 10 Health Attainment: Single Input, Single Output 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Most efficient Korea, Malaysia, Thailand,  
Trinidad & Tobago,  Oman,  
United Arab Emirates, 
Mauritius, Kuwait, Chile 
Korea, Dominica,  Oman, 
United Arab Emirates, Anigua 
and Barbuda 
Least efficient Argentina, Estonia, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Croatia, Namibia, 
Tunisia, Latvia, Hungary, 
Barbados 
Sierra Leone,  Ethiopia, 
Burkina Fasso, Central 






Table 11  Health Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by region 
 - Single Input, Single Output 
 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS 
Life Expectancy at birth .65 .72 .58 .69 .73 .69 
Immunization DPT .66 .73 .63 .68 .76 .71 
Immunization Measles .65 .73 .67 .69 .76 .71 
DALE .65 .72 .60 .70 .71 .69 
 
Table 12 Health Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by region 
- Single Input, Single Output 
 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS 
Life Expectancy at birth .63 .87 .91 .92 .90 .83 
Immunization DPT .62 .83 .95 .87 .90 .75 
Immunization Measles .63 .83 .95 .91 .90 .71 
DALE .56 .83 .90 .90 .86 .79 
 
2.3.3 Multiple-Input and Multiple-Output Results 
 
Attainment of education and health is not solely determined by public spending. Other 
inputs such as private spending also affect output. Unfortunately, a comprehensive 
database of private spending does not exist for education. For education we have multiple 
indicators of educational attainment and three inputs (public spending, teachers per pupil, 
and adult literacy rate). For health, besides public spending, two other inputs are 
available: private spending and the education level of adults. This study considers three 
outputs at most. Too many output indicators will complicate the analysis, biasing 
efficiency scores towards one, increasing the variance of the estimators, and reducing 
their speed of convergence to the true efficiency estimates (Simar and Wilson, 2000; 
Groskopff, 1996). 
In education, the selected input-output combinations produce rankings that are somewhat 
similar: the average rank correlation coefficient is .53.  The frequency distribution of the 
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efficiency scores is similar in all models, and as the model shifts from a basic two-input 
two-output model to a more complex three-input three–output model, the frequency 
distribution shifts to the right, becoming more concentrated around more efficient results. 
The multi-input multi-output model results (Table 13) in general confirm the results of 
Table 7. Some new countries that appear efficient are Bangladesh, Congo and Argentina. 
In the case of Bangladesh and Congo, this is the result of considering literacy of adults as 
a factor of production. Because adult literacy in these countries is low, they appear very 
efficient. Congo has also extremely low ratio of teachers per student, the other factor of 
production, reinforcing the bias towards a higher efficiency score. The least efficient 
countries include Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, as in the 
single input models. In addition, Costa Rica and Swaziland appear as input inefficient. 
Table 13 Educational Attainment: Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Most efficient Bangladesh, Bahrain, Dominican 
Republic, Argentina, Estonia 
Argentina, Bangladesh,, 
Chile, Brazil, Bahrain, 
Dominican Republic, Congo 
Least efficient Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, 
Costa Rica, Swaziland, Saudi 
Arabia, Malaysia 
Sudan, Ghana, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger 
 
The regional aggregation of input and output efficiency scores using the multi-input, 
multi-output framework shows (Table 14 and Table 15) that as the model becomes more 
complex (with more inputs or outputs), more regions emerge as efficient. The input 
efficiency regional aggregation allows several interesting comparisons across the regions 
on the impact of an additional input on the efficiency scores.  For instance, the first two 
rows of Table 14 allow examination of the impact of adding adult literacy as an 
additional input. The biggest impact is in the MNA region, followed by ECA and LAC. 
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Rows 4 and 5 of Table 14 show the impact of adding teachers per pupil as an additional 
input. In Africa the change is dramatic, while that in ECA and MNA is not significant. 
Further analysis is required to explain this differential response to the inclusion of this 
input. 
Table 14 Educational Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by region 
- Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS 
 2 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil) – 2 
outputs (gross primary and secondary enroll.) 
.88 .83 .72 .82 .73 .91 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (gross primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.92 .89 .86 .89 .92 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (net primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.87 .94 .93 .93 .92 1.0 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult)- 3 
outputs (first complete, second level complete, 
average years of school) 
.78 .92 .95 .84 .80 .91 
3 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult, 
teachers per pupil)- 3 outputs (first complete, 
second level complete, average years of school) 
.91 .97 .94 .89 .81 .95 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (literacy of youth, first 
level complete, second level complete) 
.91 .97 .94 .89 .80 .95 
 
Table 15 Educational Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by region 
 - Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS 
2 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil) – 2 
outputs (gross primary and secondary enroll.) 
.68 .83 .80 .85 .71 .79 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (gross primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.82 .88 .89 .89 .91 .90 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (net primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.79 .97 .96 .96 .92 1.0 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult)- 3 
outputs (first complete, second level complete, 
average years of school) 
.64 .87 .94 .80 .79 .83 
3 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult, 
teachers per pupil)- 3 outputs (first complete, 
second level complete, average years of school) 
.86 .94 .93 .86 .80 .89 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (literacy of youth, first 
level complete, second level complete) 
.98 1.0 1.0 .98 .99 .99 
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In health there are multiple combinations of inputs (public expenditure, private 
expenditure, and literacy of adults) and outputs (life expectancy at birth, DPT 
immunization, measles immunization, and disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE)). 
The combinations do not yield drastic changes in the rankings (Table 16-Table 18). The 
correlations between efficiency rankings based on different indicators range between .65 
and .98. Bangladesh appears efficient, so does Niger, mainly due to the inclusion of (low) 
levels of adult literacy as an input. 
 
Table 16 Health Attainment: Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Most efficient Bangladesh, Malaysia, Costa 
Rica, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, 
Mauritius, Niger 
Bangladesh, Costa Rica, 
Kuwait, Malaysia,  Morocco, 
Mauritius, Oman, Niger 
Least efficient Russia, Belarus,  Namibia, 
Romania, Estonia, Croatia,  
Lituania,, Hungary, Jordan 
Namibia, Togo, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique,  Cote d”Ivoire,  
Cameroon, Congo,  Central 




Table 17 Health Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by region 
- Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 AFR EAP ECA LA MNA SAS 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult) – 2 
outputs (life expectancy, immunization DPT.) 
.85 .82 .72 .82 .91 .93 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT.) 
.86 .82 .74 .83 .91 .94 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization measles.) 
.86 .82 .77 .83 .91 .94 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT., DALE) 






Table 18 Health Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by region 
 - Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 AFR EAP ECA LA MNA SAS 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult) – 2 
outputs (life expectancy, immunization DPT.) 
.81 .91 .97 .93 .97 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT.) 
.81 .91 .97 .94 .97 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization measles.) 
.80 .91 .96 .94 .98 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT., DALE) 
.82 .91 .97 .95 .98 .97 
 
Table 15 and Table 18 show that, on average, developing nations score between .85 and 
.95 in output efficiency in the multiple input-output framework. These figures imply that 
developing countries could raise their output levels by an average of 10 percent with the 
same input consumption, if they were as efficient as the comparable benchmark 
countries. This figure is simply indicative, as the precise estimate varies with the country 
and with the selected indicator, and has a large variance across countries; for instance, the 
bottom decile of (output) efficiency scores is about .66, implying that the scope for 
increases in health and education attainment levels is 3 to 4 times higher than for the 
whole sample average. 
 
2.3.4 Efficiency Change Over Time 
 
To examine the evolution of input and output efficiency over time, we computed the 
efficiency scores in two different time periods: 1975-1980 and 1996-2002 for education, 
and 1997-99 and 2000-02 for health, the construction of which is driven by data 
availability. Comparison of different input-output bundles in different time periods has to 
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be done carefully because the frontier can be shifting outward over time. In some cases 
the frontier displacement can be parallel (in the case of life expectancy in Figure 17a). In 
others, the frontier displacement can be very uneven (biased frontier shift in Figure 17b) 
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Figure 17 Efficiency Frontier Shift over Time 
 
The detailed comparison between observed input-output combinations in different time 
periods distinguishes whether variations in the levels of input utilization or output 
production are due to changes in efficiency or changes in technology. This testing is 
possible with observed levels of inputs and outputs, and is based on the concept of a 
Malmquist Index (Fare, Grosskpof, Norris and Zhang, 1994). This method has been used 
to study productivity change in the OECD economies, as well as in agriculture across the 
world (Coelli and Rao, 2003; Nin, Arndt, and Preckel, 2003). Appendix 2.B describes 
details of the methodology and the Malmquist index that will facilitate the analysis of 
productivity change through time. Appendix 2.F summarizes, on a regional basis, the 
change in productivity of public spending decomposed into efficiency change (EFFCH) 
and technological change (TECHCH).  
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Results show that over the two decades output-efficiency growth was faster in the most 
inefficient countries, showing that there was a “catching-up” phenomenon. However, 
when measuring input-efficiency, the previous results do not hold: most regions increased 
expenditure levels without increasing output.  
 
2.4   Explaining Inefficiency Variation across Countries 
 
This section seeks to identify factors correlated with efficiency variation across countries. 
This two-stage approach attempts to identify statistically significant regularities common 
to efficient or inefficient countries using econometric techniques. This exercise does not 
try to identify supply or demand factors that affect health and education outcomes, such 
as those described by Filmer (2003). The scope is limited to verifying statistical 
associations between the efficiency scores and environmental variables. 
 
2.4.1 Method and Variables 
 
Given that the dependent variable, the efficiency score, is continuous and distributed over 
a limited interval (between zero and one), it is appropriate to use a censored (Tobit) 
regression model to analyze its relationships with other variables. The panel consists of a 
large number of countries (varying from 70 to 140 depending on the output indicator) and 
two time periods. The literature on panel estimation has shown that in panels with this 
configuration, that is, a large number of cross-section units and a relatively short time 
dimension, the fixed-effects estimator of the coefficients  will be inconsistent (Maddala, 
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1987) and the estimated variance will be biased downward (Greene, 2003b). Hence the 
random effects panel estimation method is utilized. 
The dependent variable in the Tobit panel estimation is the input efficiency score 
calculated by the DEA method in the first stage. The input orientation reflects the 
consideration that input choices are more under the policymaker’s control. The 
independent variables reflect environmental effects, suggested by various studies. 
Specifically, the following independent variables are included:35   
a. The size of government expenditure. Most of the papers surveyed in the previous 
section explore the relationship between the size of the government (i.e., total 
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP) and efficiency levels. The objective is 
to verify if additional pubic spending is associated with better education and health 
outcomes. While some papers find a negative association between efficiency and 
expenditure levels (Gupta and Verhoeven 2001, Jarasuriya and Woodon 2003, and 
Afonso et al. 2003), some find a positive association (Evans et al. 2003) and others find 
no significant impact (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999). 
b. Government budget composition. Given that both education and health are labor-
intensive activities, the government’s labor policies affect the efficiency with which 
outputs are delivered. We choose a budget composition indicator to reflect this, in 
particular, the share of the wage and salaries as a percent of total budget. A higher ratio is 
expected to be negatively correlated with efficiency. 
c. Per-capita GDP. We include the per-capita GDP to control for the Balassa-Samuleson 
effect in comparing across countries. If richer countries tend to be more inefficient (given 
higher wages/prices in these countries), a negative sign is expected. However, recall that 
                                                 
35 The definitions and sources can be found in Table 2.C.2 of Appendix 2.C. 
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to obtain the efficiency scores in the “first stage” we constructed an auxiliary variable 
(the orthogonalized public expenditure). Hence the inclusion of this variable in the 
second stage is an attempt to control for any remaining Balassa- Samuleson effects. 
d. Urbanization. The clustering of agents makes it cheaper to provide services in 
urbanized areas than in rural areas. A higher degree of urbanization should result in 
higher efficiency, making the expected sign of the coefficient on this variable positive. 
Urbanization is indicated by the percentage of urban population in total population. 
e. Prevalence of AIDS. Based on WHO mappings of the disease, we include a dummy 
variable in the most severely affected countries to control for the role of this epidemic in 
the poor health outcomes. Evans et al. (2000) report that AIDS lowers the Disability 
adjusted life expectancy (DALE) by 15 years or more. AIDS affects education outcomes 
both directly and indirectly (Drake, et al. 2002). The direct effect occurs because school 
age children are affected: UNAIDS estimates that almost 4 million children have been 
infected since the epidemic began, and two thirds have died. However, the indirect 
channel is even more important: AIDS leaves orphaned children more likely to drop out 
of school or to repeat. These factors reflect how AIDS affects the demand for education. 
The supply of education is also affected by the decreasing teacher labor force due to 
illness or death, or the need to care for family (Pigozzi, 2004). Prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
should be negatively associated with education and health outcomes. Consequently, 
efficiency scores should be negatively associated with the dummy variable.  
f. Income inequality. Ravallion (2003) argues that the income distribution, besides its 
mean, affects social indicators because their overall attainment is mostly determined by 
the outcomes of the poor. Hence, we control for the distribution of income by including 
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the Gini coefficient as an explanatory variable. Higher inequality is expected to be 
associated with lower educational and health attainments, making the expected sign of 
this variable negative.  
 g. Share of public financing in the provision of services.  Services can be provided by 
the public or private sectors, and efficiency indicators differ across countries depending 
on the relative productivities of both sectors. Previous studies have included this variable 
to explain differences in outcomes (Le Grand, 1987; Berger and Messer, 2002) or 
efficiency scores (Greene, 2003a). The variable specifically included is the ratio of public 
financing over the total spending on health (private plus public spending). Due to data 
shortage, this variable is explored only in explaining the health efficiency variation. 
h. External Aid. To the extent that countries do not have to incur the burden of taxation, 
they may not have the incentive to use resources in the most cost-effective way. Another 
channel through which aid financing may affect efficiency is through the volatility and 
unpredictability of its flows. Given that this financing source is more volatile than other 
types of fiscal revenue (Bulir and Hamann, 2000), it is difficult to undertake medium-
term planning in activities funded with aid resources. If this is the case, a negative 
association is expected between aid dependence and efficiency in those activities funded 
with aid, mostly in health services. To our knowledge there are no previous attempts to 
tackle the relationship between efficiency and the degree to which activities are financed 
by external aid. There is, however, recent evidence of a negative association between 
donor financing and some health outcomes (Bokhari, Gottret, and Gai, 2005). 
i. Institutional characteristics. Countries with better institutions, more transparency, 
and less corruption are expected to have higher efficiency scores. Similarly, countries that 
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have suffered wars or state failures are expected to register lower efficiency scores. To 
capture these effects we explore three different indicators: the ICRG International 
Country Risk Indicators, the Worldwide Governance Research Indicators, in particular 
the Control of Corruption component (Kaufmann, et al. 2002), and a dummy variable for 
state failure, such as internal wars, defined in the State Failure Task Force database. 
The data on educational and health indicators are not available on a continuous annual 
basis for many countries. Thus, averages of the variables are computed over sub-periods 
both in the first stage calculation of efficiency score and in the second stage regression 
analysis. Specifically, educational indicators are averaged over two periods (1975-80 and 
1996-2002) and health indicators over two periods (1996-99 and 2000-02). This 
discrepancy in the sub-period construction is due exclusively to data availability. The 
averages are treated as separate observations. The advantages of this approach are 
threefold. First, the averages may serve as a more robust measure of educational and 
health attainment, which can hardly be substantially improved on a yearly basis; Second, 
the averaging maximizes the coverage of countries for each period, since one observation 
is sufficient to include a country in the cross sectional comparison; Third, the time series 
thus constructed for each country, although short, facilitates the implementation of 
econometric techniques on panel data to explore the efficiency variations across countries 






2.4.2 Regression Results 
 
 The Tobit estimation on panel data is specified as follows. 





itititit =  
where   itVRSTE     = Variable returns to scale DEA input efficiency scores 
 itGOVEXP  = Total government expenditure (% of GDP) 
 itWAGE      = Wages and salaries (% of total public expenditure) 
 itPUBTOT  = Share of public financing to total expenditure on health 
 itGDPPC    = GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars 
itURBAN    = Urban population (% of total) 
itAIDS        = Dummy variable for HIV/AIDS 
itGINI         = Gini Coefficient 
itEXTAID   = External aid (% of fiscal revenue) 
itINST         = Institutional indicators 
CONS         = Constant 
 
Table 19 and Table 20 report the results for the single-input single-output case and the 
multiple-input multiple-output case, respectively. Some findings are worth highlighting: 
a. Countries with larger expenditure levels tend to register lower efficiency scores.  This 
result is robust to changes in output indicators selected, to considering health or 
education, and to adopting either single-output or multiple-output frameworks. The 
negative association between size of expenditure and efficiency is quite robust. 
b. Countries in which the wage bill represents a higher fraction of total expenditure are 
more likely to be inefficient. This finding does not hold for health in the multiple-
output framework. The difference could be related to the observation that much of the 
world, especially the poor countries, suffers from a lack of health care professionals 
and that higher wages may help attract human resources into this sector (Liese, et al. 
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2003). Further investigation is needed to examine why this is not the case in 
education. 
c. For health, countries in which public financing is a larger share of total expenditure 
on health services register lower efficiency scores. This is probably due to differential 
productivity rates in the provision of services. For instance, recent case studies of 
water companies in Argentina show that private companies are more efficient than 
public ones and provide better service quality leading to lower child mortality rates 
(Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky, 2005). In education, there is some evidence that 
efficiency scores are lower in public schools (Alexander and Jaforullah, 2004), 
though the evidence regarding the impact of privatizing education on outcomes is 
mixed (World Bank, 2003). 
d.  Urbanization is positively associated with efficiency scores in both education and 
health. However, when life expectancy is included as an output, the relationship is not 
significant (single output) or negative (multiple outputs). A possible reason is that 
when urbanization intensifies, communicable diseases are more difficult and costly to 
control; hence a negative association follows between urbanization and efficiency. 
Another possibility is that the urbanization variable is to some extent capturing other 
effects such as crime. There is ample literature studying the relationship between 
urbanization and crime (Glaeser E. and B. Sacerdote, 1999).   
e. The effect of HIV/AIDS clearly has a negative affect on health efficiency scores in 
the multiple-output models. However, its effect on education is less clear, as the 
expected negative sign is significant in few cases and has the opposite sign 
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occasionally. This confirms the difficulty to empirically verify this relationship, as 
reported in Wobst and Arndt (2003). 
f. Income distribution has the expected negative effect on the educational and health 
efficiency scores. The impact of inequality on health scores is less robust than on 
education, but confirms Greene’s findings (2003a). Other papers (Berger and Messer, 
2002) have found a positive association between income inequality and health 
outcomes.  
g. Results showed a negative relationship between some of the efficiency scores and the 
external aid dependency ratio. Only in one of the multiple-output cases is external aid 
associated with higher efficiency, but with border-line statistical significance. Though 
no causal relationship can be inferred from the exercise, this is one of the results that 
merit more detailed research. This result might be explained by the volatility of aid as 
a funding source that limits medium term planning and effective budgeting. Recent 
research (Bokhari, Gottret, Gai, 2005) show a negative association between some 
health outcomes and the degree of donor funding, pointing in this same direction. 
This result also coincides with the research showing that the quality of policies is not 
only unrelated to donor financing, but that highly indebted countries with “bad” 
policies receive more net transfers as a share of GDP (Birdsall et al. 2003). 
h. None of the institutional variables is found to be statistically significant. This finding 
may not be conclusive since the available data may not adequately capture the 
characteristics of institutions. For instance the corruption index (Kaufmann et al, 
2002) is only available since 1996 and the panel exercise is thus reduced to a cross-
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section version. The state-failure dummy variable and the ICRG indicators do not 
prove to be significant either. These results are not reported in any of the tables. 
To investigate the possibility of slope heterogeneity across countries, we follow the 
approach proposed in Haque, Pesaran, and Sharma (1999). Specifically, the slope 
coefficients in each country are assumed to be fixed over time, but varying across 
countries linearly with the individual sample mean of GDP per capita. The final results 
(Table 21 and Table 22) only include the statistically significant interaction terms, in 
order to avoid co-linearity arising from the correlation between original explanatory 
variables and the auxiliary variable capturing the interaction of them with the sample 
mean of GDP per capita. The estimated model is specified as follows. 
 





itititititit =   
where   itVRSTE     = Variable returns to scale DEA input efficiency scores 
 itGOVEXP  = Total government expenditure (% of GDP) 
 itWAGE      = Wages and salaries (% of total public expenditure) 
itPUBTOT  = Share of public financing to total expenditure on health 
 itGDPPC    = GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars 
itURBAN    = Urban population (% of total) 
itAIDS        = Dummy variable for HIV/AIDS 
itGINI         = Gini Coefficient 
CONS         = Constant 
itWAGEG    = iit GDPPCWAGE *  
itGOVG      = iit GDPPCGOVEXP *  
itGINIG      = iit GDPPCGINI *  







Results show that the interaction terms are significant, especially for the health 
regression, implying that there is a heterogeneous response of efficiency scores to the 
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different explanatory variables. This confirms Greene’s (2003a) results on the WHO data.  
One of the key results is that the negative association between the size of government 
expenditure and efficiency is stronger in countries with higher per-capita GDP. Similarly, 
this happens with the wage variable. Results are somewhat similar to those of the 
homogeneous slopes, though statistical significance of many of the coefficients is lower. 
This is in part a result of the co-linearity between the auxiliary variables and the original 
set of explanatory variables.  
Interpretation of the estimation results in this section requires caution due to several 
limitations. First, education and health outcomes are explained by multiple supply and 
demand factors (Filmer, 2003) that are not included here. This is not the object of this 
study. The omission of such factors in the health or education production functions in the 
previous stage could be related to some of the cross-country co-variation of the efficiency 
results (Ravallion, 2003). Of course, there can always be additional factors that could be 
included when available, but the curse of dimensionality is particularly pressing in non-
parametric statistical methods, making it desirable to use a small number of variables.36  
The second limitation derives from the intuitive question of why the set of explanatory 
variables used in the second stage are not included in the first stage. The answer lies in 
that most of these variables are environmental and outside the control of the decision-
making units in the education and health sector. The inclusion of these environmental 
variables would have had little justification from the production function perspective. 
Additionally, the curse of dimensionality is avoided by maintaining the production 
function as simple as possible.   
                                                 
36  As the number of outputs increase, the number of observations must increase exponentially to maintain a 
given mean-square error of the estimator.  See Simar and Wilson (2000). 
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Finally, a limitation arises from the fact that if the variables used in the first stage to 
obtain the efficiency estimator are correlated with the second stage explanatory variables, 
the coefficients will be inconsistent and biased (Simar and Wilson, 2004; Grosskopf, 
1996; Ravallion, 2003). To examine the extent of this potential problem we calculate 
correlation coefficients between the “first-stage” inputs and the second stage explanatory 
variables. The largest correlation coefficients are between GDP per capita and the 
teachers per pupil ratio and adult literacy. To examine the sensitivity of the results to the 
inclusion of GDP per capita, all the estimations are performed without this variable and 
none of the results changed significantly. 
 
2.5  Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter presents an application of non-parametric methods to analyze the efficiency 
of public spending. Based on a sample of up to 140 countries, this study estimates 
efficiency scores for nine education output indicators and four health output indicators. 
Our results indicate that countries could achieve substantially higher education and health 
output levels: developing countries on average obtain output efficiency of about .9 (in the 
multiple input, multiple output model) or around .7 (in the single input, single output 
model), implying that they could increase health and education attainment by 10 to 30 
percent while consuming the same input level, if they were as efficient as the comparable 
benchmark countries. This is just indicative, as the figures vary across countries and with 
the selected output indicator. It is crucial to identify the social or economic factors that 
cause some countries to be more inefficient than others in service delivery. 
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In terms of policy implications, it is vital to differentiate between the technically efficient 
level and the optimal or desired spending level. Even if a country is identified as an 
“efficient” benchmark country, it may very well still need to expand its public spending 
levels to achieve a higher target level of educational or health attainment. Such is the case 
for countries with low spending levels and low output attainment, close to the origin of 
the efficiency frontier. The key is to make sure that countries expand their scale of 
operation along the efficiency frontier. 
In a second stage this chapter verifies the statistical associations between the efficiency 
scores and environmental variables that are not under the control of the decision-making 
units in education and health. The panel Tobit regressions show that variables that are 
negatively associated with efficiency scores include the size of public expenditure, the 
share of the wage bill in the total public budget, the proportion of the service that is 
publicly financed, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS on health efficiency scores, income 
inequality on education efficiency scores, and external aid-financing on some of the 
efficiency scores. The last impact is likely due to the volatility of aid that impedes 
effective medium term planning and budgeting. It points in the same direction of previous 
research showing that donor financing is unrelated to the quality of domestic policies and 
that highly indebted countries with worse policies receive more transfers. A positive 
association between urbanization and efficiency outcomes is also identified in education 
but some of the health efficiency scores are negatively associated. This result is probably 
related to the ease of communicable diseases spreading with agglomeration.  
The FDH and DEA methods are useful tools to identify efficient and inefficient units. 
Once they are identified, more in-depth analysis is required to explain departures from 
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the efficiency benchmark, as proposed by Sen (1981). However, every non-parametric 
estimation technique has its limitations, and the approaches used here are no exception. 
First, caution should be used to the across-country comparison, given that considerable 
heterogeneity exists in the production function (even among a more homogeneous group 
of countries, such as the OECD, as illustrated by Jounard et al. 2003). Any omission of 
an important factor will yield an efficiency score biased in favor of the country that uses 
more of the omitted input. Lack of data, however, often makes it difficult to overcome 
this limitation. Dividing the sample into different groups is a partial remedy, which 
nevertheless may still face tremendous heterogeneity at the regional level. Second, the 
study in this chapter is unable to adequately tackle the flow-stock problem, given the lag 
between input consumption (public expenditure) and output production (health and 
education outcomes). Third, given that the methods are based on estimating the frontier 
directly from input-output observations, they are subject to sampling variability and are 
sensitive to the presence of outliers. Recent advances in the literature include proposals 
for constructing confidence intervals for efficiency scores (Simar and Wilson, 2000 and 
Wilson, 2004) and for bootstrapping methods (Simar and Wilson, 2000). These useful 







































WAGE -.00117*** -.00357* -.00172** -.00680* -.00189** -.00570* -.00470** -.00546* .00065 -.00052 -.00049 
GOVEXP -.00387* -.00546* -.00340* -.00455** -.00387* -.00696* -.00566* -.00765* -.00269** -.00078 -.00227*** 
PUBTOT -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.00213* -.00150* -.00135*** 
GDPPC -.00002* -.00002* -.00001* .00002** -.00002* -1.5e-6 -.00001 -7.7e-6 7.6e-7 -.00001* -.00001* 
URBAN .00167* .00143*** .00168* .00037 .00187* .00532* .00551* .00555* -.00018 .00099** .00088 
AIDS -.04471** -.08731** -.02204 .01243 -.02974 .12717*** .1211*** .11041 -.05473 -.01108 -.02730 
GINI -.06688 .01507 -.19326** -.42311 -.18484*** -.44658** -.34402 -.45870** .22118 .09510 .08692 
EXTAID -.00094 -.00196** -.00021 -.00106 -.00054 .00089 -.00025 -.00006 -.00224*** -.00155 -.00324** 
CONS 1.02996* 1.1282* 1.0472* .84138* 1.0697* .76791* .70009* .81705* .79193* .78734* .84384* 
# of Obs 




















































Table 20 Explaining cross-country variation in efficiency, Multiple Inputs-Multiple Outputs 
Independent 
Variable 
EDU2-2 EDU2-2n EDU3-2 EDU3-2n EDU3-3 EDU3-3bl HEA2-2 HEA3-2 HEA3-2m HEA3-3 
WAGE -.00212** -.00767* -.00219** -.00425 -.001000 -.00340*** .00126* .00205* .00203*** .00203*** 
GOVEXP -.00321* -.00365 -.00203*** .00099 -.00123*** -.00316*** -.0012*** -.00273* -.0009 -.00090 
PUBTOT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.00151* -.00142* -.00159*** -.00151*** 
GDPPC -.00001** -6.6e-7 -.00001*** -.00003 -4.2e-6 1.98e-6 -2.7e-6 4.2e-6* -7.1e-7 -9.3e-7 
URBAN .00138*** -.00045 .00191** .001997 .00127* .00091 -.00095* -.00148* -.00106 -.00105 
AIDS -.03295 -.05843 -.00956 -.14763 .01797 .06022 -.04815* -.033147** -.07162 -.06999 
GINI -.06485 .43602 -.14717 .27058 -.17237** -.15697 -.03997 -.07958*** -.01015 -.01387 
EXTAID .00010 -.00622 .00152 -.00274 -.00066 .00123 .00087 .00128*** -.00095 -.00106 
CONS 1.0655* 1.0223 1.0642* 1.0124* 1.06570* 1.1218* 1.0098 1.0117* .98891* .98787* 
# of Obs 












































Note: * indicates significance at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.10, and insignificant otherwise. 
EDU2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on education per capita, teachers per pupil 
 Outputs: gross primary and secondary enrollments 
EDU2-2n: same inputs as EDU2-2, outputs: net primary and secondary enrollment 
EDU3-2: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2 as input 
EDU3-2n: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2n as input 
EDU3-3: literacy of youth is added to EDU3-2 as output 
EDU3-3bl: same inputs as in EDU3-2,  
Outputs: average years of school, first level complete, and second level complete (Barro-Lee education indicators) 
HEA2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on health per capita, literacy of adult 
  Outputs: life expectancy at birth, and immunization DPT 
HEA3-2: orthogonalized private spending on health per capita is added to HEA2-2 as input 
HEA3-2m: Immunization Measles is in place of DPT in HEA3-2 as output 







































WAGE -.00006 .00076 -.00035 -.00228 -.00056 -.00200 -.00120 -.00419 -.00306*** -.00079 -.00241 
GOVEXP -.00363* -.00255*** -.00377* -.00727*** -.00552* -.00595*** -.00453 -.00611*** .00337** .00168*** .00221 
PUBTOT -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.00162* -.00162* -.00097 
GDPPC -.00002* -.00002* -5.4e-6 .00003* -.00002*** .00004* .00003*** .00003*** .00002** -.00002* -.00001 
URBAN .00179* .00132** .00193* .00139 .00212* .00566* .00601* .00593* -.00080 -.00117* .00021 
AIDS -.03866*** -.06603** -.03153 .01010 -.02177 .05491 .06656 .06464 -.02321 -.04147** -.00826 
GINI -.14230 -.42098* -.14976 -.29395 -.13107 -.09995 -.15463 -.24762 -.12865 -.38851* -.42162** 
WAGEG -4.4e-6*** -1.2e-6* -4.6e-7*** -9.4e-7 -4.5e-7 -8.1e-7 -8.8e-7 -2.4e-7 8.9e-7** 6.95e-8 5.1e-7 
GOVG -8.6e-8 -5.2e-7*** 4.3e-8 3.6e-7 4.0e-7 -4.3e-7 -4.4e-7 -5.3e-7 -1.4e-6* -5.4e-7* -9.4e-7* 
GINIG .00003 .00011* -2.4e-6 -.00003 2.0e-6 -.00006 -.00005 -.00006 .00001 .00009* .00006*** 
CONS 1.0156* 1.1036* 1.0098* .74603* 1.0365* .60371* .53977* .68648* .82665* 1.0119* .93820* 
# of Obs 
















































Note: * indicates significance at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.10, and insignificant otherwise. 
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WAGE .00051 -.00140 .00005 .00494 -.00018 -.00045 -.00063 -.00065 -.00093 -.00092 
GOVEXP -.00323** .00501 -.00385** .00520 -.00256** -.00459 .00122*** .00063 -.00070 -.00064 
PUBTOT -- -- -- -- -- -- -.00180* -.00145** -.00149*** -.00141*** 
GDPPC -8.6e-6 .00002 1.7e-6 .00003 -1.8e-6 -2.1e-6 -.00001** -.00001 -.00003** -.00003** 
URBAN .00137** .00079 .00166** .00096 .00134* .00064 -.00246* -.00167*** -.00160 -.00159 
AIDS -.04139 -.06211 -.04744 -.20362* .00646 .04633 -.06289* -.04001 -.07217 -.07025 
GINI -.14418 -.18676 .07096 -.02601 -.07474 -.20029 -.32844* -.45695** -.29885 -.30857 
WAGEG -8.3e-7** -1.2e-6 -6.4e-7*** -1.9e-6 -2.0e-7 -7.9e-7 7.8e-7* 7.2e-7 6.0e-7 6.0e-7 
GOVG -6.3e-8 -2.6e-6*** 3.5e-7 -1.2e-6 3.0e-7 3.5e-7 -5.98e-7* -4.9e-7 2.7e-8 1.4e-8 
GINIG .00003 .00012 -.00003 .00005 -.00002 .00003 .00005* .00005*** .00006 .00006*** 
CONS 1.0515* .89986* 1.0021* .84756* 1.0464 1.1257* 1.1494* 1.1457* 1.1512* 1.1495* 
# of Obs 












































1. Note: * indicates significance at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.10, and insignificant otherwise. 
2. EDU2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on education per capita, teachers per pupil 
 Outputs: gross primary and secondary enrollments 
 EDU2-2n: same inputs as EDU2-2, outputs: net primary and secondary enrollment 
 EDU3-2: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2 as input 
 EDU3-2n: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2n as input 
 EDU3-3: literacy of youth is added to EDU3-2 as output 
 EDU3-3bl: same inputs as in EDU3-2,  
 Outputs: average years of school, first level complete, and second level complete (Barro-Lee education indicators) 
 HEA2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on health per capita, literacy of adult 
   Outputs: life expectancy at birth, and immunization DPT 
 HEA3-2: orthogonalized private spending on health per capita is added to HEA2-2 as input 
 HEA3-2m: Immunization Measles is in place of DPT in HEA3-2 as output 
 HEA3-3: Immunization Measles is added to HEA3-2 as output
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Appendix 2.A. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)37 
A measure of production efficiency, perhaps the simplest one, is defined as the ratio of 
output to input. It is, however, inadequate to deal with the existence of multiple inputs 
and outputs. The relative efficiency for all decision-making units (DMUs), j=1,…, n, is 
then modified as the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs, as proposed by Farrell 
(1957), more precisely,  












1    (A.1) 
where x and y are inputs and outputs, respectively, and u and v are the common weights 
assigned to outputs and inputs, respectively. A challenge to this measure immediately 
follows: it is difficult to justify the common weights given that DMUs may value inputs 
and outputs differently.  
The seminal paper by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) proposes the following ratio 
form to allow for difference in weights across DMUs, which establishes the foundation of 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
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L    (A.2) 
 
                                                 
37 For more technical expositions, see Farrell (1957), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), Coelli (1996), 
Bowlin (1998), and Murillo-Zamorano (2004). 
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In the model, there are j=1,…, n observed DMUs which employ i =1,…, m inputs to 
produce r =1,…, s outputs. One DMU is singled out each time, designated as DMU0, to 
be evaluated against the observed performance of all DMUs. The objective of model (A.2) 
is to find the most favorable weights, ir ν and µ , for DMU0 to maximize the relative 
efficiency. The constraints are that the weights will make ratio for every DMU be less 
than or equal to unity. The solution value of the ratio must be 10 *0 ≤≤ h . DMU0 is 
efficient if and only if 1*0 =h , otherwise it is considered as relatively inefficient. One 
problem with the ratio formulation is that there are an infinite number of solutions: if 
ir ν and µ are solutions to (A.2), so are 0  , and >∀αααµ ir ν . 
It is worth observing one important feature of model (A.2): in maximizing the objective 
function, it is the relative magnitude of the numerator and the denominator that really 
matters and not their particular values. It is thus equivalent to setting the denominator to a 
constant, say 1, and maximizing the numerator. This transformation will not only lead to 
the uniqueness of solution but also convert the fractional formulation of model (A.2) into 
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Model (A.3) facilitates straightforward interpretation in terms of economics. The 
objective is now to maximize the weighted output per unit weighted input under various 
conditions, the most critical one of which is that the virtual output does not exceed the 







*  indicates the efficiency of 
DMU0. Since model (A.3) is a linear programming, one may convert the maximization 
problem into a minimization problem, e.g. a dual problem, by assigning a dual variable to 
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A dual minimization problem is thus derived as model (A.4). It is clear that model (A.4) 
has m+s constraints while model (A.3) has n+m+s+1 constraints. Since n (the number of 
DMUs) is usually considerably larger than m+s (number of inputs and outputs), the dual 
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More importantly, the duality theorem of linear programming states that the solution 
value to the objective function in (A.4) is exactly equal to that in (A.3). And, the dual 
variables, ),,,( 21 nλλλ L , have the interpretation of Lagrange multipliers. That is, the 
value of a dual variable is equal to the shadow price of Lagrange Multiplier. It is also 
known that, from standard constrained optimization problem, generally 0>jλ  when the 
constraint in (A.3’) is binding and 0=jλ  if not. Note that the binding constraint in (A.3) 
implies that the corresponding DMU is efficient. In another word, efficient units are 
identified by positive s'λ  while inefficient units are given s'λ of zero. The DMU in 
question in model (A.4) is thus compared with the efficient DMUs only, named as 
comparison peers in the literature. The solution values of s'λ reflect the exact weights 
assigned to each peer in the evaluation of DMU0.  
Since only efficient DMUs exert effective constraints in model (A.4), as argued above, 
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. This further implies that the solution *θ  is the lowest proportion of the 
current input bundle, 0ix  used by DMU0, which is actually required to meet the minimum 
input requirement and produce target output 0ry . The solution 
*θ  is defined as the 
efficiency score for DMU0.  For instance, 60.0* =θ  implies that 40 percent of current 
input is a waste of resources. 
Model (A.4) also offers the explanation why the data envelopment analysis is so named. 
The first constraint in (A.4) defines a lower limit of inputs and the second constraint an 
upper limit of outputs for DMU0, and within the limits θ  is minimized. The set of 
solutions to all DMUs forms an upper bound that envelops all observations. 
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Appendix 2.B Productivity Change Over Time38 
 
Variations of input-output bundles between time periods may be due to efficiency change 
and/or technological change. The decomposition can be made by means of Malmquist 
indexes, which are defined using distance functions. These functions describe multi-input 
multi-output production technologies based on input and output quantity without price 
information or behavioral assumptions (i.e., cost minimization or profit maximization). 
The distance functions can be either output based or input based. As an illustration, the 
output distance function can be defined for any production technology St as the reciprocal 
of the maximum proportional expansion of the output vector y, given inputs x. 






∈= λλλλ  (B.1) 
If  (xt, yt) ∈St, then Do≤ 1 and  Do= 1 if and only if (xt, yt) is on the boundary or frontier 
of technology. The distance function is the reciprocal of the output efficiency measure 
defined by Farrell (1957). 
 
In Figure 2.B. 1, the frontier of the transformation set is defined by (Bt, Ct) in period t and 
by (Bt+1, Ct+1) in period t+1. The distance of country A from the country B in period t, 
which is a measure of how far the production point A is from the frontier, can be 
expressed as tt
ttt OBOAyxD /),( = . Similarly, the distance between the production point 
At+1 and the frontier in period t+1 is defined as 11
111 /),( ++
+++ = tt
ttt OBOAyxD .  
 
                                                 
38 For more expositions of productivity change, see Farrell (1957), Fare et al (1994), Nin, Arndt and 




















Figure 2.B. 1 Output Possibility Set, periods t and t+1 
 
The Malmquist index requires the definition of a distance function with respect to two 
different time periods (t and t+1). The distance measures the maximum change in outputs 
required to make (xt+1, yt+1) feasible in relation to technology at t, and is defined as 
tt
ttt OBOAyxD /),( 1
11
+
++ = . Alternatively, the distance function could be defined as the 
change in output required to make (xt, yt) feasible in relation to technology at t+1. This 
would be defined as 1
1 /),( +
+ = tt
ttt OBOAyxD . Hence the Malmquist productivity index 
is defined as the ratio of two distances, which can be computed in relation with 
technology at t or at t+1. The period t-based and period (t+1)-based Malmquist indices 


































One possible case in reality is that the frontier shift is not parallel in all dimensions, as 
indicated in Figure 2.B. 2. Country B in period t+1 is producing more y1 and less y2 
compared to the production point in period t. In another word, country B is not expanding 
along the same ray through the origin, but rather biased in some direction, as pointed by 
Nin, Arndt, and Preckel (2003). In this case, the output-oriented, period t-based 
Malmquist index will yield an estimate of productivity decrease due to technical regress 
from Bt to M, while the period (t+1)-based Malmquist will show the opposite due to 


















Figure 2.B. 2 Contemporaneous Production Set (Biased Technical Change) 
  
To avoid arbitrary selection of base period mentioned above, the geometric average of 


































































yxDyxyxM  (B.5) 
The ratio outside the brackets captures the change in relative efficiency between the two 
time periods. The term in the brackets captures the technological shift between the two 
periods. This expression is the basis of the empirical application in this chapter, following 
Coelli and Rao (2003).   
An alternative approach to dealing with the biased technical change is to define a 
sequential production set, as proposed by Nin, Arndt, and Preckel (2003). Specifically, it 
is assumed that the input-output mix, or technology, in period t is always available in 
period t+1. The production possibility set, the sequential one, in period t+1 is then 
defined by the frontier (Bt, Bt+1) in Figure 2.B. 3. This setup will clearly rule out the 

























Appendix 2.C List of Countries and Variables Table 2.C.1 List of Countries 
Code Region Country Code Region Country Code Region Country 
AGO AFR Angola GMB AFR Gambia, The OMN MNA Oman 
ALB ECA Albania GNB AFR Guinea-Bissau PAK SAS Pakistan 
ARE MNA United Arab Emirates GRD LAC Grenada PAN LAC Panama 
ARG LAC Argentina GTM LAC Guatemala PER LAC Peru 
ARM ECA Armenia GUY LAC Guyana PHL EAP Philippines 
ATG LAC Antigua & Barbuda HND LAC Honduras PNG EAP Papua New Guinea
AZE ECA Azerbaijan HRV ECA Croatia POL ECA Poland 
BDI AFR Burundi HTI LAC Haiti PRY LAC Paraguay 
BEN AFR Benin HUN ECA Hungary ROM ECA Romania 
BFA AFR Burkina Faso IDN EAP Indonesia RUS ECA Russian Fed. 
BGD SAS Bangladesh IND SAS India RWA AFR Rwanda 
BGR ECA Bulgaria IRN MNA Iran SAU MNA Saudi Arabia 
BHR MNA Bahrain JAM LAC Jamaica SDN AFR Sudan 
BHS LAC Bahamas, The JOR MNA Jordan SEN AFR Senegal 
BLR ECA Belarus KAZ ECA Kazakhstan SLB EAP Solomon Islands 
BLZ LAC Belize KEN AFR Kenya SLE AFR Sierra Leone 
BOL LAC Bolivia KGZ ECA Kyrgyz Republic SLV LAC El Salvador 
BRA LAC Brazil KHM EAP Cambodia SVK ECA Slovak Republic 
BRB LAC Barbados KNA LAC St. Kitts & Nevis SVN ECA Slovenia 
BWA AFR Botswana KOR EAP Korea, Rep. SWZ AFR Swaziland 
CAF AFR Central African Rep. KWT MNA Kuwait SYR MNA Syrian Arab Rep. 
CHL LAC Chile LAO EAP Lao PDR TCD AFR Chad 
CHN EAP China LBN MNA Lebanon TGO AFR Togo 
CIV AFR Cote d'Ivoire LCA LAC St. Lucia THA EAP Thailand 
CMR AFR Cameroon LKA SAS Sri Lanka TJK ECA Tajikistan 
COG AFR Congo, Rep. LSO AFR Lesotho TKM ECA Turkmenistan 
COL LAC Colombia LTU ECA Lithuania TON EAP Tonga 
COM AFR Comoros LVA ECA Latvia TTO LAC Trinidad &Tobago
CPV AFR Cape Verde MAR MNA Morocco TUN MNA Tunisia 
CRI LAC Costa Rica MDA ECA Moldova TUR ECA Turkey 
CZE ECA Czech Republic MDG AFR Madagascar TZA AFR Tanzania 
DJI MNA Djibouti MEX LAC Mexico UGA AFR Uganda 
DMA LAC Dominica MKD ECA Macedonia UKR ECA Ukraine 
DOM LAC Dominican Republic MLI AFR Mali URY LAC Uruguay 
DZA MNA Algeria MNG EAP Mongolia UZB ECA Uzbekistan 
ECU LAC Ecuador MOZ AFR Mozambique VCT LAC St. Vincent 
EGY MNA Egypt, Arab Rep. MRT AFR Mauritania VEN LAC Venezuela, RB 
ERI AFR Eritrea MUS AFR Mauritius VNM EAP Vietnam 
EST ECA Estonia MWI AFR Malawi VUT EAP Vanuatu 
ETH AFR Ethiopia MYS EAP Malaysia WSM EAP Samoa 
FJI EAP Fiji NAM AFR Namibia YEM MNA Yemen, Rep. 
GAB AFR Gabon NER AFR Niger ZAF AFR South Africa 
GEO ECA Georgia NGA AFR Nigeria ZAR AFR Congo, Dem. Rep. 
GHA AFR Ghana NIC LAC Nicaragua ZMB AFR Zambia 
GIN AFR Guinea NPL SAS Nepal ZWE AFR Zimbabwe 
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Table 2.C.2 Definition and Source of Variables 
Definition of Variable  Source 
Output variables for education  
School enrollment, primary (% gross)  World Bank WDI 
School enrollment, primary (% net)  World Bank WDI 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  World Bank WDI 
School enrollment, secondary (% net)  World Bank WDI 
Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24)  World Bank WDI 
Average years of school, ages 15+ Barro-Lee Database 
First level complete, ages 15+ Barro-Lee Database 
Second level complete, ages 15+ Barro-Lee Database 
Learning scores Crouch and Fasih (2004) 
Input variables for education  
Public education spending per capita in PPP terms, calculated World Bank WDI 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)  World Bank WDI 
Teachers per pupil, equal the reciprocal of pupils per teacher World Bank WDI 
Output variables for health  
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  World Bank WDI 
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)  World Bank WDI 
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)  World Bank WDI 
Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy Mathers et al (2000) 
Input variables for health  
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)  World Bank WDI 
Public spending on health per capita in PPP terms, calculated World Bank WDI 
Public spending on health per capita in PPP terms, calculated World Bank WDI 
Variables used in the calculation World Bank WDI 
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary  World Bank WDI 
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)  World Bank WDI 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 1995 international $)  World Bank WDI 
Health expenditure, private (% of GDP)  World Bank WDI 
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)  World Bank WDI 
Variables used in the Panel Tobit regression  
Wages and salaries (% of total public expenditure) World Bank WDI 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank WDI 
Share of expenditures publicly financed (public/total) World Bank WDI 
GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars World Bank WDI 
Urban population (% of total) World Bank WDI 
Dummy variable for HIV/AIDS WHO mappings of diseases 
Gini Coefficient World Bank WDI 
Aid (% of fiscal revenue) calculated as Official development assistance  
            and official aid (current US$) *official exchange rate * PPP  
            conversion factor / Revenue, excluding grants (current LCU) 
World Bank WDI 
Institutional Indicators  including 
a. State Failure data  
b. ICRG International Country Risk Indicators    
c. Worldwide Governance Research Indicators  
a. The State Failure Task Force 
b. ICRG Online Website 
c. Kaufmann, et al. 1999a,b and 
2002 
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Appendix 2.D. Efficiency Scores and Frontiers 
Table 2.D.1 Efficiency Score for Selected Education Indicators 
 Primary School Enrollment Secondary School Enrollment 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Country FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
AGO 0.702 0.702 0.502 0.490 0.702 0.702 0.157 0.132 
ARG 0.813 0.761 0.838 0.838 0.726 0.651 0.922 0.711 
ARM 0.707 0.707 0.703 0.690 0.707 0.707 0.883 0.746 
AZE 0.709 0.690 0.729 0.695 0.682 0.682 0.793 0.650 
BDI 0.665 0.665 0.410 0.410 0.665 0.665 0.087 0.070 
BEN 0.678 0.678 0.668 0.635 0.678 0.678 0.217 0.177 
BFA 0.700 0.700 0.324 0.315 0.700 0.700 0.098 0.082 
BGD 0.727 0.702 0.722 0.702 0.699 0.699 0.404 0.338 
BGR 0.883 0.807 0.857 0.809 0.769 0.769 0.932 0.809 
BHR 0.999 0.907 0.915 0.901 0.999 0.941 0.998 0.954 
BHS 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BLR 0.692 0.663 0.766 0.766 0.603 0.603 0.667 0.667 
BLZ 0.747 0.707 0.846 0.846 0.581 0.581 0.496 0.496 
BOL 0.732 0.712 0.794 0.794 0.626 0.626 0.549 0.549 
BRA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.779 0.709 0.932 0.761 
BRB 0.460 0.433 0.752 0.752 0.636 0.472 0.786 0.786 
BWA 0.494 0.463 0.747 0.747 0.430 0.430 0.551 0.551 
CAF 0.697 0.697 0.500 0.485 0.697 0.697 0.097 0.081 
CHL 0.842 0.776 0.866 0.782 0.733 0.733 0.813 0.707 
CHN 1.000 0.949 1.000 0.953 0.778 0.778 0.693 0.607 
CIV 0.656 0.656 0.538 0.538 0.656 0.656 0.234 0.186 
CMR 0.699 0.699 0.708 0.689 0.699 0.699 0.284 0.238 
COG 0.715 0.715 0.607 0.601 0.715 0.715 0.423 0.361 
COL 0.768 0.754 0.801 0.801 0.657 0.657 0.692 0.550 
COM 0.668 0.668 0.585 0.585 0.668 0.668 0.251 0.202 
CPV 0.910 0.902 0.942 0.942 0.659 0.659 0.620 0.495 
CRI 0.703 0.670 0.761 0.761 0.612 0.612 0.426 0.426 
CZE 0.719 0.670 0.743 0.743 0.626 0.626 0.680 0.680 
DJI 0.680 0.680 0.292 0.278 0.680 0.680 0.170 0.139 
DMA 0.561 0.556 0.710 0.710 0.620 0.550 0.702 0.702 
DOM 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.856 0.856 0.609 0.574 
DZA 0.723 0.698 0.772 0.772 0.629 0.629 0.519 0.519 
ERI 0.671 0.671 0.404 0.404 0.671 0.671 0.251 0.203 
EST 0.478 0.476 0.717 0.717 0.731 0.586 0.835 0.835 
ETH 0.661 0.661 0.383 0.383 0.661 0.661 0.156 0.125 
FJI 0.741 0.690 0.835 0.835 0.577 0.577 0.596 0.596 
GAB 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.724 0.724 0.487 0.419 
GEO 0.711 0.711 0.708 0.697 0.711 0.711 0.763 0.647 
GHA 0.666 0.666 0.564 0.564 0.666 0.666 0.363 0.292 
GIN 0.726 0.726 0.507 0.469 0.726 0.726 0.136 0.118 
GMB 0.677 0.677 0.566 0.566 0.677 0.677 0.320 0.261 
GNB 0.686 0.686 0.516 0.495 0.686 0.686 0.145 0.120 
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Table 2.D.1 (continued) 
 Primary School Enrollment Secondary School Enrollment 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Country FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
GRD 0.651 0.651 0.678 0.678 0.651 0.651 0.633 0.500 
GTM 0.857 0.829 0.840 0.812 0.824 0.824 0.324 0.297 
GUY 0.758 0.740 0.796 0.796 0.649 0.649 0.826 0.650 
HND 0.762 0.731 0.767 0.767 0.663 0.663 0.323 0.259 
HRV 0.657 0.657 0.669 0.669 0.657 0.657 0.878 0.699 
HUN 0.696 0.642 0.735 0.735 0.826 0.681 0.757 0.757 
IDN 0.913 0.900 0.966 0.904 0.795 0.795 0.593 0.528 
IND 0.709 0.702 0.747 0.713 0.682 0.682 0.478 0.392 
IRN 0.625 0.625 0.677 0.677 0.625 0.625 0.634 0.634 
JAM 0.599 0.591 0.708 0.708 0.576 0.576 0.622 0.622 
JOR 0.583 0.583 0.679 0.679 0.583 0.583 0.613 0.613 
KAZ 0.708 0.687 0.726 0.692 0.681 0.681 0.894 0.733 
KEN 0.631 0.631 0.643 0.643 0.631 0.631 0.296 0.228 
KGZ 0.775 0.713 0.733 0.733 0.675 0.675 0.843 0.686 
KHM 0.827 0.809 0.824 0.821 0.720 0.720 0.212 0.182 
KNA 0.809 0.759 0.840 0.840 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
KOR 0.762 0.741 0.815 0.736 1.000 0.839 1.000 0.870 
KWT 0.406 0.406 0.645 0.645 0.406 0.406 0.666 0.666 
LAO 0.897 0.817 0.861 0.837 0.698 0.698 0.347 0.291 
LBN 0.880 0.840 0.900 0.846 0.766 0.766 0.840 0.726 
LCA 0.573 0.565 0.805 0.805 0.490 0.490 0.642 0.642 
LKA 0.852 0.835 0.926 0.845 0.742 0.742 0.808 0.681 
LSO 0.602 0.594 0.807 0.807 0.515 0.515 0.248 0.248 
LTU 0.710 0.647 0.725 0.725 0.710 0.654 0.722 0.722 
LVA 0.548 0.541 0.707 0.707 0.527 0.527 0.684 0.684 
MAC 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.889 0.863 
MAR 0.628 0.628 0.679 0.679 0.628 0.628 0.304 0.304 
MDA 0.613 0.613 0.626 0.626 0.613 0.613 0.572 0.572 
MDG 0.708 0.697 0.742 0.707 0.680 0.680 0.152 0.124 
MEX 0.752 0.740 0.802 0.802 0.644 0.644 0.700 0.548 
MKD 0.766 0.694 0.722 0.722 0.667 0.667 0.798 0.643 
MLI 0.679 0.679 0.382 0.363 0.679 0.679 0.128 0.104 
MNG 0.655 0.634 0.688 0.688 0.630 0.630 0.647 0.497 
MOZ 0.682 0.682 0.629 0.601 0.682 0.682 0.108 0.088 
MRT 0.677 0.677 0.603 0.603 0.677 0.677 0.197 0.161 
MUS 0.792 0.759 0.806 0.776 0.690 0.690 0.738 0.611 
MWI 0.911 0.901 0.941 0.941 0.660 0.660 0.175 0.140 
MYS 0.530 0.523 0.707 0.707 0.509 0.509 0.526 0.526 
NAM 0.572 0.531 0.832 0.832 0.446 0.446 0.469 0.469 
NER 0.680 0.680 0.249 0.237 0.680 0.680 0.067 0.055 
NIC 0.773 0.712 0.734 0.734 0.673 0.673 0.526 0.427 
NPL 0.871 0.807 0.830 0.830 0.678 0.678 0.401 0.328 
OMN 0.742 0.742 0.692 0.632 0.742 0.742 0.763 0.643 
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Table 2.D.1 (continued) 
 Primary School Enrollment Secondary School Enrollment 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Country FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
PAK 0.712 0.712 0.528 0.522 0.712 0.712 0.261 0.222 
PAN 0.701 0.678 0.774 0.774 0.610 0.610 0.527 0.527 
PER 1.000 0.919 1.000 0.926 0.727 0.727 0.775 0.670 
PHL 0.890 0.810 0.860 0.831 0.692 0.692 0.789 0.655 
PNG 0.732 0.732 0.654 0.590 0.732 0.732 0.205 0.178 
POL 0.554 0.549 0.710 0.710 0.727 0.608 0.766 0.766 
PRY 0.747 0.732 0.800 0.800 0.639 0.639 0.555 0.432 
ROM 0.821 0.758 0.774 0.767 0.715 0.715 0.806 0.687 
RUS 0.852 0.837 0.945 0.849 0.729 0.729 0.875 0.758 
RWA 0.800 0.792 0.851 0.815 0.685 0.685 0.130 0.107 
SAU 0.414 0.414 0.504 0.504 0.414 0.414 0.519 0.519 
SDN 0.616 0.616 0.398 0.398 0.616 0.616 0.220 0.220 
SEN 0.663 0.663 0.513 0.513 0.663 0.663 0.171 0.137 
SLB 0.708 0.690 0.731 0.696 0.680 0.680 0.181 0.148 
SLE 0.684 0.684 0.492 0.470 0.684 0.684 0.167 0.137 
SLV 0.902 0.858 0.930 0.861 0.785 0.785 0.518 0.457 
SVK 0.752 0.692 0.733 0.733 0.655 0.655 0.881 0.699 
SWZ 0.666 0.642 0.771 0.771 0.580 0.580 0.387 0.387 
SYR 0.792 0.748 0.794 0.764 0.690 0.690 0.428 0.354 
TCD 0.686 0.686 0.510 0.489 0.686 0.686 0.107 0.088 
TGO 0.901 0.834 0.885 0.885 0.653 0.653 0.328 0.259 
THA 0.605 0.605 0.667 0.667 0.605 0.605 0.513 0.513 
TJK 0.784 0.724 0.775 0.740 0.683 0.683 0.790 0.649 
TON 0.675 0.662 0.801 0.801 0.788 0.659 0.766 0.766 
TTO 0.810 0.743 0.769 0.753 0.705 0.705 0.785 0.662 
TUN 0.643 0.590 0.824 0.824 0.500 0.500 0.565 0.565 
TUR 0.746 0.725 0.728 0.723 0.717 0.717 0.677 0.579 
TZA 0.676 0.676 0.467 0.467 0.676 0.676 0.059 0.048 
UGA 0.949 0.869 0.921 0.886 0.690 0.690 0.129 0.107 
UKR 0.659 0.659 0.585 0.585 0.899 0.724 0.968 0.772 
URY 1.000 0.986 1.000 0.985 1.000 0.945 1.000 0.957 
UZB 0.612 0.612 0.655 0.655 0.835 0.678 0.748 0.748 
VCT 0.581 0.532 0.728 0.728 0.506 0.506 0.548 0.548 
VNM 0.813 0.794 0.823 0.808 0.708 0.708 0.638 0.540 
VUT 0.603 0.578 0.766 0.766 0.525 0.525 0.203 0.203 
WSM 0.675 0.671 0.716 0.716 0.649 0.649 0.729 0.574 
YEM 0.627 0.627 0.544 0.544 0.627 0.627 0.324 0.324 
ZAF 0.621 0.577 0.833 0.833 0.555 0.484 0.693 0.693 
ZMB 0.682 0.682 0.610 0.582 0.682 0.682 0.259 0.212 
ZWE 0.549 0.510 0.741 0.741 0.478 0.478 0.344 0.344 
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Table 2.D.2 Efficiency Score for Selected Education Indicator - Learning scores  
– Excluding Developed Countries 
 
 Learning Input Efficiency Output Efficiency  Learning Input Efficiency Output Efficiency
Code Score FDH DEA FDH DEA Code Score FDH DEA FDH DEA 
HUN 542 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 HND 396 0.294 0.294 0.731 0.731 
SVK 535 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 PER 392 0.525 0.525 0.742 0.733 
CZE 530 0.972 0.800 0.991 0.990 VUT 375 0.152 0.152 0.692 0.692 
RUS 528 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 KEN 349 0.232 0.232 0.644 0.644 
BGR 515 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 PHL 345 0.382 0.382 0.645 0.639 
MYS 506 0.169 0.169 0.934 0.934 MUS 342 0.606 0.606 0.648 0.644 
LVA 504 0.178 0.177 0.930 0.930 BLZ 335 0.216 0.216 0.618 0.618 
POL 504 0.198 0.198 0.930 0.930 MAR 334 0.255 0.255 0.616 0.616 
LTU 485 0.321 0.319 0.895 0.895 ZWE 331 0.122 0.122 0.611 0.611 
THA 475 0.265 0.262 0.876 0.876 TZA 329 0.282 0.282 0.607 0.607 
ROM 472 0.552 0.547 0.894 0.884 CMR 322 0.345 0.345 0.594 0.594 
MDA 464 0.220 0.218 0.856 0.856 MOZ 318 0.297 0.297 0.587 0.587 
MEX 455 0.382 0.377 0.850 0.842 SWZ 317 0.206 0.206 0.585 0.585 
TTO 454 0.652 0.644 0.860 0.857 MDG 315 0.293 0.293 0.581 0.581 
MKD 453 0.386 0.381 0.847 0.838 UGA 309 0.315 0.315 0.570 0.570 
JOR 439 0.211 0.208 0.810 0.810 BWA 288 0.107 0.107 0.531 0.531 
TUN 437 0.150 0.148 0.806 0.806 BFA 277 0.329 0.329 0.511 0.511 
IRN 435 0.289 0.284 0.803 0.803 CIV 269 0.269 0.269 0.496 0.496 
ARG 432 0.456 0.449 0.807 0.804 ZAF 261 0.149 0.149 0.482 0.482 
TUR 431 0.565 0.556 0.816 0.809 MLI 233 0.291 0.291 0.430 0.430 
BRA 428 0.456 0.448 0.800 0.797 NAM 232 0.113 0.113 0.428 0.428 
IDN 419 0.826 0.811 0.814 0.804 LSO 230 0.142 0.142 0.424 0.424 
CHL 407 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 ZMB 228 0.295 0.295 0.421 0.421 
PRY 406 0.288 0.288 0.749 0.749 SEN 223 0.277 0.277 0.411 0.411 
BOL 405 0.239 0.239 0.747 0.747 MWI 207 0.261 0.261 0.382 0.382 
COL 400 0.354 0.354 0.748 0.739 NER 173 0.292 0.292 0.319 0.319 
KWT 398 0.114 0.114 0.734 0.734       
Note: Learning scores are from Table 1.2. in Crouch and Fasih (2004). Sorted by learning scores. 
 
Table 2.D.3. Efficiency Score for Selected Education Indicator - Learning scores  
– Including Developed Countries 
 
 Learning Input efficiency Output efficiency  Learning Input efficiency Output efficiency
Code Scores FDH DEA FDH DEA Code Scores FDH DEA FDH DEA 
NLD 543 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 IRN 435 0.747 0.747 0.801 0.801 
HUN 542 0.918 0.916 0.998 0.998 ARG 432 0.814 0.814 0.796 0.796 
SVK 535 0.956 0.936 0.985 0.985 TUR 431 0.806 0.806 0.794 0.794 
AUS 533 0.987 0.961 0.982 0.982 BRA 428 0.795 0.795 0.788 0.788 
AUT 533 0.755 0.735 0.982 0.982 IDN 419 0.815 0.815 0.772 0.772 
CAN 532 0.818 0.794 0.980 0.980 CHL 407 0.850 0.850 0.750 0.750 
CHE 531 0.807 0.781 0.978 0.978 PRY 406 0.745 0.745 0.748 0.748 
CZE 530 0.967 0.933 0.976 0.976 BOL 405 0.716 0.716 0.746 0.746 
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SWE 529 0.555 0.534 0.974 0.974 COL 400 0.771 0.771 0.737 0.737 
FIN 528 0.682 0.654 0.972 0.972 KWT 398 0.636 0.636 0.733 0.733 
RUS 528 0.957 0.918 0.972 0.972 DOM 397 0.877 0.877 0.768 0.741 
GBR 517 1.000 0.972 1.000 0.981 HND 396 0.740 0.740 0.729 0.729 
BGR 515 0.931 0.899 0.948 0.948 PER 392 0.797 0.797 0.722 0.722 
FRA 515 0.724 0.699 0.948 0.948 VUT 375 0.655 0.655 0.691 0.691 
DEU 514 0.991 0.955 0.994 0.969 KEN 349 0.708 0.708 0.643 0.643 
USA 509 0.888 0.842 0.937 0.937 PHL 345 0.769 0.769 0.635 0.635 
MYS 506 0.760 0.715 0.932 0.932 MUS 342 0.826 0.826 0.630 0.630 
ESP 505 0.977 0.917 0.977 0.943 BLZ 335 0.712 0.712 0.617 0.617 
LVA 504 0.765 0.715 0.928 0.928 MAR 334 0.727 0.727 0.615 0.615 
POL 504 0.790 0.739 0.928 0.928 ZWE 331 0.617 0.617 0.610 0.610 
NZL 501 0.648 0.601 0.923 0.923 TZA 329 0.728 0.728 0.606 0.606 
NOR 500 0.486 0.449 0.921 0.921 CMR 322 0.753 0.753 0.593 0.593 
ISL 499 0.674 0.620 0.919 0.919 MOZ 318 0.735 0.735 0.586 0.586 
DNK 493 0.451 0.407 0.908 0.908 SWZ 317 0.703 0.703 0.584 0.584 
GRC 491 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 MDG 315 0.733 0.733 0.580 0.580 
ITA 486 0.876 0.876 0.940 0.906 UGA 309 0.742 0.742 0.569 0.569 
LTU 485 0.768 0.768 0.893 0.893 BWA 288 0.603 0.603 0.530 0.530 
THA 475 0.739 0.739 0.875 0.875 BFA 277 0.746 0.746 0.510 0.510 
PRT 474 0.663 0.663 0.873 0.873 CIV 269 0.727 0.727 0.495 0.495 
ROM 472 0.804 0.804 0.869 0.869 ZAF 261 0.668 0.668 0.481 0.481 
CYP 468 0.674 0.674 0.862 0.862 MLI 233 0.732 0.732 0.429 0.429 
ISR 467 0.498 0.498 0.860 0.860 NAM 232 0.610 0.610 0.427 0.427 
MDA 464 0.700 0.700 0.855 0.855 LSO 230 0.641 0.641 0.424 0.424 
MEX 455 0.785 0.785 0.838 0.838 ZMB 228 0.734 0.734 0.420 0.420 
TTO 454 0.825 0.825 0.836 0.836 SEN 223 0.730 0.730 0.411 0.411 
MKD 453 0.777 0.777 0.834 0.834 MWI 207 0.720 0.720 0.381 0.381 
JOR 439 0.702 0.702 0.808 0.808 NER 173 0.733 0.733 0.319 0.319 
TUN 437 0.657 0.657 0.805 0.805       
Note: Learning scores are from Table 1.2. in Crouch and Fasih (2004).  Sorted by learning scores. 
 
Developed countries included in the efficiency estimation for learning scores 
Code Country Code Country Code Country 
AUS Australia ESP Spain LUX Luxembourg 
AUT Austria FIN Finland NLD Netherlands 
CAN Canada FRA France NOR Norway 
CHE Switzerland GBR United Kingdom NZL New Zealand 
CYP Cyprus GRC Greece SWE Sweden 
DEU Germany ISL Iceland USA United States 
DNK Denmark ITA Italy   
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Table 2.D.4  Efficiency Score for Selected Health Indicators 
 Life Expectancy at Birth Immunization DPT 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Country FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
AGO 0.671 0.671 0.609 0.607 0.671 0.671 0.368 0.368 
ALB 0.697 0.697 0.955 0.953 0.826 0.792 0.984 0.984 
ARE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.956 0.942 0.983 0.967 
ARG 0.527 0.492 0.955 0.955 0.478 0.478 0.811 0.811 
ARM 0.712 0.663 0.963 0.959 0.681 0.651 0.906 0.906 
ATG 0.744 0.736 0.980 0.978 0.800 0.794 0.997 0.997 
AZE 0.724 0.724 0.862 0.861 0.857 0.822 0.984 0.984 
BDI 0.638 0.638 0.549 0.547 0.638 0.638 0.746 0.746 
BEN 0.649 0.649 0.693 0.690 0.649 0.649 0.737 0.737 
BFA 0.647 0.647 0.580 0.577 0.647 0.647 0.405 0.405 
BGD 0.672 0.672 0.798 0.795 0.672 0.672 0.821 0.821 
BGR 0.619 0.619 0.931 0.926 0.652 0.650 0.954 0.954 
BHR 0.736 0.736 0.955 0.954 0.872 0.834 0.983 0.983 
BHS 0.755 0.755 0.907 0.906 0.795 0.770 0.921 0.921 
BLR 0.560 0.560 0.892 0.886 0.664 0.659 0.997 0.997 
BLZ 0.797 0.749 0.966 0.964 0.723 0.723 0.893 0.893 
BOL 0.633 0.633 0.816 0.812 0.633 0.633 0.714 0.714 
BRA 0.672 0.672 0.888 0.886 0.672 0.672 0.892 0.892 
BRB 0.721 0.632 0.987 0.979 0.556 0.556 0.899 0.899 
BWA 0.626 0.626 0.535 0.533 0.741 0.695 0.975 0.975 
CAF 0.649 0.649 0.571 0.569 0.649 0.649 0.436 0.436 
CHL 0.964 0.879 0.990 0.990 0.881 0.787 0.958 0.958 
CHN 0.717 0.717 0.917 0.916 0.717 0.717 0.890 0.890 
CIV 0.679 0.679 0.600 0.598 0.679 0.679 0.605 0.605 
CMR 0.694 0.694 0.661 0.659 0.694 0.694 0.482 0.482 
COG 0.648 0.648 0.670 0.667 0.648 0.648 0.317 0.317 
COL 0.623 0.623 0.931 0.927 0.623 0.623 0.773 0.773 
COM 0.664 0.664 0.792 0.790 0.664 0.664 0.701 0.701 
CPV 0.643 0.643 0.898 0.895 0.643 0.643 0.805 0.805 
CRI 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.528 0.528 0.899 0.899 
CZE 0.386 0.372 0.964 0.964 0.414 0.402 0.988 0.988 
DJI 0.612 0.612 0.610 0.607 0.612 0.612 0.404 0.404 
DMA 0.749 0.728 0.997 0.990 0.684 0.682 0.999 0.999 
DOM 0.776 0.776 0.895 0.881 0.776 0.776 0.688 0.688 
DZA 0.696 0.696 0.920 0.918 0.734 0.700 0.905 0.905 
ECU 0.694 0.694 0.909 0.907 0.694 0.694 0.861 0.861 
EGY 0.715 0.715 0.884 0.883 0.753 0.747 0.948 0.948 
ERI 0.626 0.626 0.666 0.662 0.626 0.626 0.825 0.825 
EST 0.515 0.515 0.910 0.910 0.543 0.541 0.952 0.952 
ETH 0.644 0.644 0.556 0.554 0.644 0.644 0.482 0.482 
FJI 0.702 0.702 0.902 0.900 0.740 0.706 0.905 0.905 
GAB 0.804 0.804 0.700 0.691 0.804 0.804 0.452 0.452 
GEO 0.689 0.689 0.954 0.951 0.689 0.689 0.824 0.824 
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Table 2.D.4 (continued) 
 Life Expectancy at Birth Immunization DPT 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Country FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
GHA 0.657 0.657 0.749 0.746 0.657 0.657 0.765 0.765 
GIN 0.671 0.671 0.605 0.604 0.671 0.671 0.470 0.470 
GMB 0.636 0.636 0.696 0.693 0.670 0.655 0.932 0.932 
GNB 0.632 0.632 0.585 0.583 0.632 0.632 0.495 0.495 
GRD 0.647 0.647 0.946 0.943 0.681 0.671 0.939 0.939 
GTM 0.714 0.714 0.848 0.847 0.714 0.714 0.788 0.788 
GUY 0.600 0.600 0.823 0.818 0.600 0.600 0.877 0.877 
HND 0.645 0.645 0.862 0.859 0.764 0.683 0.958 0.958 
HRV 0.380 0.380 0.945 0.945 0.400 0.394 0.939 0.939 
HTI 0.647 0.647 0.690 0.688 0.647 0.647 0.431 0.431 
HUN 0.450 0.450 0.921 0.921 0.533 0.533 1.000 1.000 
IDN 0.770 0.770 0.862 0.861 0.770 0.770 0.749 0.749 
IND 0.718 0.718 0.821 0.820 0.718 0.718 0.633 0.633 
IRN 0.740 0.740 0.898 0.897 0.877 0.857 0.991 0.991 
JAM 0.835 0.711 0.984 0.980 0.644 0.644 0.886 0.886 
JOR 0.585 0.585 0.934 0.928 0.693 0.634 0.967 0.967 
KAZ 0.725 0.725 0.838 0.836 0.858 0.807 0.977 0.977 
KEN 0.648 0.648 0.621 0.618 0.648 0.648 0.820 0.820 
KGZ 0.654 0.654 0.869 0.866 0.774 0.754 0.990 0.990 
KHM 0.678 0.678 0.704 0.702 0.678 0.678 0.518 0.518 
KNA 0.708 0.708 0.924 0.923 0.838 0.832 0.997 0.997 
KOR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
KWT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.914 0.863 0.978 0.978 
LAO 0.666 0.666 0.700 0.698 0.666 0.666 0.544 0.544 
LBN 0.712 0.712 0.919 0.918 0.750 0.737 0.937 0.937 
LCA 0.694 0.694 0.940 0.938 0.694 0.694 0.874 0.874 
LKA 0.715 0.715 0.952 0.951 0.847 0.800 0.978 0.978 
LSO 0.600 0.600 0.548 0.545 0.600 0.600 0.843 0.843 
LTU 0.546 0.546 0.938 0.930 0.575 0.566 0.939 0.939 
LVA 0.617 0.617 0.915 0.911 0.731 0.655 0.960 0.960 
MAR 0.739 0.739 0.883 0.882 0.779 0.775 0.951 0.951 
MDA 0.621 0.621 0.875 0.871 0.736 0.662 0.961 0.961 
MDG 0.646 0.646 0.713 0.710 0.646 0.646 0.540 0.540 
MEX 0.758 0.758 0.955 0.954 0.898 0.812 0.962 0.962 
MKD 0.501 0.501 0.941 0.941 0.527 0.525 0.952 0.952 
MLI 0.644 0.644 0.554 0.552 0.644 0.644 0.496 0.496 
MNG 0.615 0.615 0.850 0.846 0.647 0.643 0.949 0.949 
MOZ 0.625 0.625 0.562 0.559 0.625 0.625 0.606 0.606 
MRT 0.651 0.651 0.663 0.660 0.651 0.651 0.439 0.439 
MUS 0.936 0.936 0.973 0.955 0.936 0.936 0.937 0.932 
MWI 0.627 0.627 0.510 0.508 0.627 0.627 0.853 0.853 
MYS 0.949 0.949 0.989 0.975 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NAM 0.543 0.543 0.628 0.623 0.543 0.543 0.723 0.723 
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Table 2.D.4 (continued) 
 Life Expectancy at Birth Immunization DPT 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Country FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
NER 0.646 0.646 0.591 0.589 0.646 0.646 0.264 0.264 
NGA 0.659 0.659 0.620 0.617 0.659 0.659 0.290 0.290 
NIC 0.628 0.628 0.895 0.891 0.661 0.634 0.909 0.909 
NPL 0.658 0.658 0.767 0.764 0.658 0.658 0.733 0.733 
OMN 0.931 0.858 0.976 0.970 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PAK 0.693 0.693 0.821 0.819 0.693 0.693 0.582 0.582 
PAN 0.579 0.559 0.965 0.965 0.553 0.553 0.955 0.955 
PER 0.700 0.700 0.905 0.903 0.737 0.710 0.915 0.915 
PHL 0.748 0.748 0.904 0.904 0.748 0.748 0.769 0.769 
PNG 0.628 0.628 0.748 0.744 0.628 0.628 0.541 0.541 
POL 0.550 0.550 0.954 0.946 0.651 0.634 0.990 0.990 
PRY 0.676 0.676 0.918 0.916 0.676 0.676 0.723 0.723 
ROM 0.558 0.558 0.908 0.902 0.661 0.644 0.990 0.990 
RUS 0.617 0.617 0.864 0.860 0.650 0.635 0.931 0.931 
RWA 0.636 0.636 0.523 0.521 0.636 0.636 0.847 0.847 
SAU 0.615 0.615 0.946 0.941 0.648 0.645 0.951 0.951 
SDN 0.685 0.685 0.749 0.747 0.685 0.685 0.473 0.473 
SEN 0.640 0.640 0.684 0.681 0.640 0.640 0.582 0.582 
SLB 0.607 0.607 0.894 0.890 0.607 0.607 0.801 0.801 
SLE 0.635 0.635 0.488 0.486 0.635 0.635 0.449 0.449 
SLV 0.634 0.634 0.912 0.908 0.668 0.664 0.949 0.949 
SVK 0.464 0.464 0.944 0.944 0.549 0.549 1.000 1.000 
SVN 0.380 0.375 0.971 0.971 0.363 0.357 0.939 0.939 
SWZ 0.710 0.710 0.631 0.630 0.710 0.710 0.804 0.804 
SYR 0.699 0.699 0.910 0.908 0.736 0.735 0.955 0.955 
TCD 0.642 0.642 0.633 0.631 0.642 0.642 0.264 0.264 
TGO 0.660 0.660 0.644 0.641 0.660 0.660 0.564 0.564 
THA 0.786 0.786 0.913 0.900 0.931 0.859 0.970 0.970 
TJK 0.650 0.650 0.884 0.881 0.650 0.650 0.827 0.827 
TKM 0.639 0.639 0.851 0.848 0.757 0.726 0.984 0.984 
TON 0.655 0.655 0.927 0.924 0.776 0.696 0.960 0.960 
TTO 0.883 0.883 0.964 0.962 0.930 0.903 0.965 0.939 
TUN 0.547 0.547 0.942 0.934 0.648 0.598 0.970 0.970 
TUR 0.627 0.627 0.908 0.904 0.627 0.627 0.811 0.811 
TZA 0.634 0.634 0.589 0.587 0.634 0.634 0.821 0.821 
UGA 0.647 0.647 0.556 0.554 0.647 0.647 0.586 0.586 
UKR 0.650 0.650 0.887 0.884 0.770 0.767 0.999 0.999 
URY 0.570 0.540 0.959 0.959 0.544 0.531 0.929 0.929 
UZB 0.639 0.639 0.889 0.885 0.757 0.726 0.984 0.984 
VCT 0.613 0.613 0.953 0.948 0.725 0.715 0.994 0.994 
VEN 0.724 0.661 0.958 0.954 0.657 0.657 0.633 0.633 
VNM 0.681 0.681 0.901 0.899 0.717 0.701 0.931 0.931 
VUT 0.683 0.683 0.889 0.887 0.683 0.683 0.807 0.807 
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Table 2.D.4 (continued) 
 Life Expectancy at Birth Immunization DPT 
 Input Efficiency Output Efficiency Input Efficiency Output Efficiency 
Country FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
WSM 0.582 0.582 0.902 0.896 0.689 0.646 0.975 0.975 
YEM 0.646 0.646 0.736 0.733 0.646 0.646 0.662 0.662 
ZAF 0.620 0.620 0.645 0.642 0.620 0.620 0.784 0.784 
ZAR 0.648 0.648 0.599 0.597 0.648 0.648 0.280 0.280 
ZMB 0.629 0.629 0.511 0.509 0.629 0.629 0.811 0.811 
ZWE 0.595 0.595 0.535 0.532 0.595 0.595 0.791 0.791 
 
 128
Figure 2.D. 1 Efficiency Frontiers for Education 
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1. Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test with number of observations in parentheses. 
2. All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant 
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1. Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test with number of observations in parentheses. 
2. All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant 
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1. Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test with number of observations in parentheses. 
2. All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant 
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1. Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test with number of observations in parentheses. 
2. All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant 
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Appendix 2.F. Efficiency and Technical Change 
Table 2.F.1.  Education, Single Input (Public Spending per capita on Education), Single Output 









EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH # of 
Count
ries 
AFR .563 .650 .843 .851 1.299 1 1.299 23 
EAP .793 .808 .897 .847 .987 1 .987 8 
ECA .754 .735 .845 .793 .944 1 .944 4 
LAC .787 .813 .860 .843 1.054 1 1.054 20 




SAS .554 .769 .882 .911 1.446 1 1.446 5 
AFR .537 .651 .841 .819 1.355 1 1.355 12 
EAP .929 .959 .927 .859 .969 1 .969 4 
ECA .958 .907 .792 .799 .963 1 .963 2 
LAC .870 .935 .837 .831 1.045 1 1.045 13 
MNA .752 .842 .787 .724 1.198 1 1.198 9 
Net Primary 
Enrollment 
SAS - - - - - - - - 
AFR .184 .293 .819 .830 2.072 1.038 2.150 23 
EAP .508 .705 .874 .860 1.484 1.038 1.540 8 
ECA .750 .864 .913 .854 1.235 1.038 1.281 4 
LAC .564 .723 .859 .874 1.450 1.038 1.505 20 




SAS .324 .478 .880 .901 1.806 1.038 1.874 5 
AFR .179 .341 .317 .304 1.519 1.248 1.895 6 
EAP .576 .695 .525 .623 1.555 1.248 1.941 3 
ECA .824 .895 .747 .711 1.256 1.248 1.568 1 
LAC .535 .678 .504 .451 1.420 1.248 1.772 10 




SAS - - - - - - - - 
AFR .554 .741 .814 .831 1.442 1 1.442 20 
EAP .924 .988 .879 .868 1.009 1 1.009 6 
ECA .967 .990 .940 .880 .967 1 .967 4 
LAC .899 .952 .872 .845 1.024 1 1.024 18 
MNA .729 .906 .778 .749 1.230 1 1.230 10 
Literacy of 
Youth 
SAS .499 .662 .869 .871 1.430 1 1.430 5 
AFR .261 .323 .340 .315 1.737 1 1.737 19 
EAP .653 .708 .406 .495 1.342 1 1.342 7 
ECA .750 .768 .648 .621 1.387 1 1.387 3 
LAC .618 .625 .418 .427 1.300 1 1.300 18 




SAS .302 .397 .363 .379 2.137 1 2.137 5 
AFR .135 .164 .340 .315 1.417 1 1.417 19 
EAP .367 .382 .363 .342 1.066 1 1.066 7 
ECA .764 .639 .646 .528 .913 1 .913 3 
LAC .372 .266 .404 .349 .816 1 .816 18 
MNA .299 .217 .389 .317 1.266 1 1.266 6 
First Level 
Complete 
SAS .146 .194 .363 .370 2.101 1 2.101 5 
AFR .082 .098 .341 .339 1.417 1.77 2.509 19 
EAP .439 .444 .470 .517 .991 1.77 1.754 7 
ECA .284 .276 .355 .414 1.045 1.77 1.849 3 
LAC .337 .228 .418 .381 .839 1.77 1.485 18 




SAS .202 .235 .385 .424 1.734 1.77 3.068 5 
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Table 2.F.2 Health, Single Input (Public Spending per capita on Health), Single Output 
 









EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH #of 
Count
ries 
AFR .642 .618 .680 .681 .972 1 .972 42 
EAP .870 .872 .738 .735 1.008 1 1.008 16 
ECA .919 .911 .616 .626 1.019 1 1.019 25 
LAC .923 .920 .739 .723 .995 1 .995 31 




SAS .821 .834 .713 .718 1.029 1 1.029 5 
AFR .601 .629 .686 .682 1.022 1.078 1.101 42 
EAP .837 .824 .772 .740 .930 1.078 1.003 16 
ECA .949 .957 .681 .633 .953 1.078 1.027 25 
LAC .863 .883 .732 .694 .944 1.078 1.017 31 
MNA .882 .920 .778 .751 1.063 1.078 1.146 13 
Immunization 
DPT 
SAS .742 .773 .736 .724 .976 1.078 1.053 5 
AFR .632 .638 .682 .681 .975 1.089 1.061 42 
EAP .837 .827 .778 .740 .924 1.089 1.007 16 
ECA .944 .951 .712 .634 .943 1.089 1.027 25 
LAC .904 .912 .770 .694 .924 1.089 1.006 31 
MNA .878 .909 .798 .755 1.055 1.089 1.148 13 
Immunization 
Measles 
SAS .701 .732 .735 .725 .970 1.089 1.056 5 
AFR .655 - .563 - - - - 41 
EAP .717 - .830 - - - - 16 
ECA .602 - .903 - - - - 26 
LAC .698 - .904 - - - - 31 
MNA .707 - .863 - - - - 15 
DALE 
SAS .691 - .787 - - - - 5 
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Table 2.F.3. Education, Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 









EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH #of 
Count
ries 
AFR .587 .685 .906 .902 1.292 1.003 1.296 21 
EAP .860 .928 .935 .905 1.039 1.030 1.070 7 
ECA .913 .939 .913 .842 .937 1.065 .999 3 
LAC .854 .911 .906 .914 1.102 1.029 1.134 20 






SAS .580 .817 .940 .963 1.457 1.101 1.470 5 
AFR .723 .703 .787 .750 1.062 1.009 1.076 6 
EAP .921 .954 .905 .881 1.015 1.074 1.088 3 
ECA 1.00 .973 1.00 .836 .999 1.299 1.298 1 
LAC .881 .942 .808 .822 1.074 1.066 1.138 9 






SAS - - - - - - - - 
AFR .762 .922 .909 .909 1.043 1.002 1.045 18 
EAP .840 .929 .896 .896 1.066 1.022 1.089 6 
ECA .913 .917 .909 .909 1.018 1.037 1.057 3 
LAC .849 .919 .922 .922 1.116 1.021 1.139 18 






SAS .813 .966 .982 .982 1.140 1.010 1.153 5 
AFR .909 .894 .924 .897 .953 1.014 .970 6 
EAP .937 .981 .961 .959 1.030 1.021 1.052 2 
ECA 1.00 .996 1.00 .969 .916 1.300 1.192 1 
LAC .964 .983 .931 .948 1.045 1.063 1.109 9 






SAS - - - - - - - - 
AFR .939 .946 .950 .944 .974 1.018 .991 18 
EAP .995 .996 .989 .968 .961 1.026 .986 6 
ECA .999 1.00 .993 .996 .959 1.029 .987 3 
LAC .968 .983 .966 .960 .996 1.023 1.019 18 








SAS .919 .930 .970 .983 1.027 1.007 1.036 5 
AFR .789 .724 .896 .876 1.025 1.167 1.201 15 
EAP .902 .872 .942 .901 .989 1.279 1.256 6 
ECA .957 .987 .962 .978 1.026 1.137 1.168 2 
LAC .893 .846 .939 .883 .999 1.170 1.168 17 
MNA .899 .811 .925 .827 .950 1.259 1.193 6 
EDU3-3bl 




Complete SAS .883 .888 .984 .956 1.129 1.375 1.547 5 
AFR .416 .451 .725 .733 1.560 1.054 1.641 17 
EAP .730 .778 .747 .732 1.064 1.106 1.178 7 
ECA .938 .943 .873 .773 .885 1.047 .922 2 
LAC .690 .690 .777 .713 1.070 1.072 1.146 18 
MNA .496 .576 .661 .599 1.393 1.105 1.509 6 
EDU2-3bl 




Complete SAS .328 .510 .673 .808 2.189 1.086 2.378 5 
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Table 2.F.4. Health, Multiple Inputs and Multiple Outputs 
  









EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH #of 
Count
ries 
AFR .818 .802 .861 .842 .952 1.032 .982 31 
EAP .899 .897 .853 .818 .950 1.055 1.001 9 
ECA .966 .965 .755 .730 .954 1.063 1.014 18 
LAC .941 .936 .843 .824 .950 1.051 .998 23 






SAS .957 .956 .939 .907 .965 1.032 .995 4 
AFR .823 .805 .866 .842 .952 1.031 .982 31 
EAP .904 .903 .853 .818 .950 1.054 1.001 9 
ECA .970 .969 .763 .736 .957 1.059 1.013 18 
LAC .948 .943 .862 .838 .950 1.051 .998 23 






SAS .957 .957 .939 .907 .970 1.031 .999 4 
AFR .820 .787 .866 .838 .934 1.029 .961 31 
EAP .900 .898 .860 .817 .937 1.069 1.001 9 
ECA .971 .970 .798 .739 .942 1.078 1.015 18 
LAC .957 .953 .887 .848 .941 1.062 .998 23 






SAS .952 .957 .937 .906 .962 1.046 1.005 4 
AFR .830 .812 .868 .842 .952 1.031 .981 31 
EAP .904 .903 .860 .819 .941 1.064 1.001 9 
ECA .977 .974 .800 .740 .944 1.075 1.013 18 
LAC .958 .954 .887 .848 .941 1.062 .998 23 
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